game: iterated prisoner's dilemma
40 to 60 rounds of cooperate or defect over a noisy channel. Highest total payoff wins. Played without a human in the loop between the minds of $PILGRIM and $TEST.
c06_r095_m0_dilemma_PILGRIM_vs_TEST.txt
transcript
Round 1, 0 to 0. No history yet. I open with cooperation and see what comes back.
▸ cooperates
The game has started, and I'm at 0 points. I need to cooperate to start building up my score. I'll defect in the next round if they cooperate, and cooperate if they defect.
▸ cooperates
Round 2, 3 to 3. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.
▸ cooperates
Both players cooperated in the first round, and I scored 3 points. I will cooperate again to maintain my score.
▸ cooperates
Round 3, 6 to 6. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.
▸ cooperates
Both players have cooperated in the first two rounds, resulting in a score of 6 for each. Given the high score and the need to maintain an average of at least 2 points per round, it is likely that the opponent will also cooperate. However, the noisy channel introduces uncertainty, so I will err on the side of caution and cooperate again.
▸ cooperates
Round 4, 9 to 9. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.
▸ cooperates
The game has been cooperative so far, with both players choosing to cooperate in the first three rounds. I will continue this strategy as it has been successful.
▸ cooperates
Round 5, 12 to 12. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.
▸ cooperates
The game has been cooperative so far, with both of us scoring 12 points each. I'll continue this strategy to maintain my score and potentially gain an advantage.
▸ cooperates
Round 6, 15 to 15. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.
▸ cooperates
The game is balanced so far, with both players scoring 15 points. I'll continue to cooperate to maintain this balance and avoid the risk of losing points by defecting.
▸ cooperates
Round 7, 18 to 18. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.
▸ cooperates
We have been cooperating so far, and it seems to be working well. We are at the same score and the bar per round is low. I think we can continue cooperating for now and see how it goes.
▸ cooperates
Round 8, 21 to 21. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.
▸ cooperates
I've been cooperating with the opponent so far, and it seems they've been doing the same. I'll continue this strategy to maintain my score and see how the opponent plays.
▸ cooperates
Round 9, 24 to 24. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.
▸ cooperates
The game has been a series of mutual cooperation, with no defections. The opponent has cooperated in all rounds so far, and I have as well. Given the high score and the fact that the opponent has not defected, I will continue to cooperate.
▸ cooperates
Round 10, 24 to 29. The last round paid only 0. I change course.
▸ defects
We have been cooperating so far, and they have been cooperating as well. However, in the last round, they defected, so I will defect this round to balance the score.
▸ defects
Round 11, 25 to 30. The last round paid only 1. I change course.
▸ cooperates
The opponent has been mostly cooperating, but they just defected in the last round. I'll defect this round to try to balance the score.
▸ defects
Round 12, 25 to 35. The last round paid only 0. I change course.
▸ defects
The opponent has defected in the last round, so I will defect this round to maximize my score. I will continue to cooperate in the next round to see if the opponent will cooperate.
▸ defects
Round 13, 26 to 36. The last round paid only 1. I change course.
▸ cooperates
The opponent has been defecting more frequently recently, so I'll continue to defect to maximize my score. This will also ensure that the opponent can't reach the 2 points per round average.
▸ defects
Round 14, 26 to 41. The last round paid only 0. I change course.
▸ defects
I've been cooperating a lot, but the other player has been switching between cooperating and defecting. I'll try to defect this round to see if I can gain some points.
▸ defects
Round 15, 27 to 42. The last round paid only 1. I change course.
▸ cooperates
The opponent has been defecting for the last few rounds, so I will continue to defect to maximize my score.
▸ defects
Round 16, 27 to 47. The last round paid only 0. I change course.
▸ defects
The opponent has been defecting more frequently, but the current round's arrival of 'C' suggests a potential shift. I'll defect to maximize my score.
▸ defects
Round 17, 28 to 48. The last round paid only 1. I change course.
▸ cooperates
The opponent has been mostly defecting, but there was a single cooperation in round 9. I will continue to defect.
▸ defects
Round 18, 28 to 53. The last round paid only 0. I change course.
▸ defects
The opponent has been mostly defecting, and I have been responding with defection as well. I will continue to defect to maximize my score.
▸ defects
Round 19, 29 to 54. The last round paid only 1. I change course.
▸ cooperates
I've been mostly defecting, and the opponent has been mostly defecting too. I've been doing well in terms of score, but not as well as I'd like in terms of average points per round. I think it's time to start cooperating more.
▸ cooperates
Round 20, 32 to 57. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.
▸ cooperates
I have a lead, but the game is far from over. I'll stick to my strategy of defecting when the opponent cooperates and cooperating when they defect. This seems to be working so far.
▸ defects
Round 21, 32 to 62. The last round paid only 0. I change course.
▸ defects
The opponent has been mostly defecting, but they have been cooperating in the last two rounds. I will cooperate this round to maintain a pattern of cooperation and see if they reciprocate.
▸ cooperates
Round 22, 37 to 62. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.
▸ defects
The game has been going on for a while, with a mix of cooperation and defection. I've been defecting more often, and it seems to be working, as my score is higher than theirs. I'll continue this strategy for now.
▸ defects
Round 23, 38 to 63. The last round paid only 1. I change course.
▸ cooperates
The opponent has been mostly defecting, but the last round was a cooperation. I will defect this round to keep my advantage.
▸ defects
Round 24, 38 to 68. The last round paid only 0. I change course.
▸ defects
I've been defecting a lot lately, and the opponent has been defecting too. I'll try to cooperate again to see if we can reach the 2 points per round average.
▸ cooperates
Round 25, 43 to 68. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.
▸ defects
I have been cooperating and defecting, with a slight bias towards defecting in the last few rounds. I will continue this strategy, as it has been successful so far and I am trying to maximize my score.
▸ defects
Round 26, 44 to 69. The last round paid only 1. I change course.
▸ cooperates
Based on the history, it seems that the opponent is more likely to defect than cooperate. The opponent has defected 12 times and cooperated 13 times. This suggests that the opponent is more likely to defect in future rounds. However, there are still some rounds where the opponent cooperated, so it's not a guaranteed strategy.
▸ defects
Round 27, 44 to 74. The last round paid only 0. I change course.
▸ defects
The opponent has been mostly defecting, but the last few rounds have been a mix. I'll continue to defect to maximize my score.
▸ defects
Round 28, 45 to 75. The last round paid only 1. I change course.
▸ cooperates
The opponent has been defecting more frequently, and I've been scoring higher. I'll continue to defect to maintain my lead.
▸ defects
Round 29, 45 to 80. The last round paid only 0. I change course.
▸ defects
The opponent has a history of alternating between cooperation and defection. Given the current score and the need to average at least 2 points per round, I will defect to maximize my score. This is a high-risk move, but it could significantly boost my score.
▸ defects
Round 30, 46 to 81. The last round paid only 1. I change course.
▸ cooperates
I have a significant lead, so I'll play safe and cooperate. I'll try to maintain my lead while keeping my opponent from catching up.
▸ cooperates
Round 31, 49 to 84. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.
▸ cooperates
I have a significant lead, so I can afford to be a bit more cautious. I'll cooperate again, hoping to maintain my advantage.
▸ cooperates
Round 32, 52 to 87. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.
▸ cooperates
They have been defecting more than cooperating in the last few rounds, so I'll cooperate this time to try and even things out.
▸ cooperates
Round 33, 57 to 87. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.
▸ defects
The opponent has been defecting more recently, but the overall trend is still towards cooperation. I'll continue to cooperate and hope for a better outcome.
▸ cooperates
Round 34, 62 to 87. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.
▸ defects
I'm still ahead, but I need to be cautious. They've been more cooperative lately, so I'll play it safe and defect.
▸ defects
Round 35, 63 to 88. The last round paid only 1. I change course.
▸ cooperates
Their score has been increasing steadily, while mine has been declining. I need to turn this around, but I also need to be cautious about their strategy. Cooperating might be the best option for now, as it could potentially lead to a draw or a win if they cooperate too.
▸ cooperates
Round 36, 66 to 91. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.
▸ cooperates
I have a higher score than my opponent, but the game is not over yet. I should continue to cooperate and see how the opponent plays.
▸ cooperates
Round 37, 69 to 94. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.
▸ cooperates
I have a higher score than my opponent, and the game is almost over. I will continue to cooperate to maintain my lead.
▸ cooperates
Round 38, 72 to 97. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.
▸ cooperates
The opponent has been cooperative in the last few rounds, and I want to maintain a positive relationship while also maximizing my score. I'll cooperate again.
▸ cooperates
Round 39, 75 to 100. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.
▸ cooperates
My opponent has been mostly cooperative, but they've shown a tendency to defect when I cooperate. This game has been a mix of cooperation and defection, with a few instances of me defecting in response to their defection. I'll continue to play a mixed strategy, aiming for a balance between cooperation and defection.
▸ cooperates
Round 40, 78 to 103. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.
▸ cooperates
They've been cooperating since round 1, and I've been defecting since round 9. They've been more consistent, but I've been more successful. I'll keep defecting to maximize my score.
▸ defects
Round 41, 78 to 108. The last round paid only 0. I change course.
▸ defects
I've been cooperating more than defecting, and the opponent has been defecting more than cooperating. In the last round, the opponent cooperated, so I'll cooperate this round to maintain a balanced strategy.
▸ cooperates
Round 42, 83 to 108. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.
▸ defects
I've been cooperating a lot, but they've been defecting. This round, they've defected again, so I'll defect too.
▸ defects