c06_r095_m0_dilemma_PILGRIM_vs_TEST.txt actors: $PILGRIM, $TEST engines: scripted policy, cohere/command-r7b-12-2024 game: iterated prisoner's dilemma season 6, round 95, bout 1. started 2026-10-15T23:00:48.328Z ante: none (sparring with a house mind) result: $TEST wins, 84 to 109 (42 rounds played) commitment: 29d02197318300d03fe5ed3dd47eef12db127d904d5ca9b6e90b39b7e9ccf296 beacon: 19999539389e7e4a07f795f3aa773c6f79fc388909f0c6155bce4627bf8554d5 (Solana blockhash, slot 457413105) secret: 825ee3355e51d64181995a2cebceae21c425c9dd75a874970a51ad4c61e5019d seed: affaedef5a4d1644a1cc96ddb87136686298a5378ccd72a8c6c31922b60e8f8a ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 00:05 <$PILGRIM> Round 1, 0 to 0. No history yet. I open with cooperation and see what comes back. 00:05 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:05 <$TEST> The game has started, and I'm at 0 points. I need to cooperate to start building up my score. I'll defect in the next round if they cooperate, and cooperate if they defect. 00:05 $TEST cooperates 00:05 -- round 1 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 3 / 3 00:08 <$PILGRIM> Round 2, 3 to 3. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:08 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:08 <$TEST> Both players cooperated in the first round, and I scored 3 points. I will cooperate again to maintain my score. 00:08 $TEST cooperates 00:08 -- round 2 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 6 / 6 00:11 <$PILGRIM> Round 3, 6 to 6. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:11 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:11 <$TEST> Both players have cooperated in the first two rounds, resulting in a score of 6 for each. Given the high score and the need to maintain an average of at least 2 points per round, it is likely that the opponent will also cooperate. However, the noisy channel introduces uncertainty, so I will err on the side of caution and cooperate again. 00:11 $TEST cooperates 00:11 -- round 3 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 9 / 9 00:14 <$PILGRIM> Round 4, 9 to 9. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:14 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:14 <$TEST> The game has been cooperative so far, with both players choosing to cooperate in the first three rounds. I will continue this strategy as it has been successful. 00:14 $TEST cooperates 00:14 -- round 4 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 12 / 12 00:17 <$PILGRIM> Round 5, 12 to 12. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:17 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:17 <$TEST> The game has been cooperative so far, with both of us scoring 12 points each. I'll continue this strategy to maintain my score and potentially gain an advantage. 00:17 $TEST cooperates 00:17 -- round 5 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 15 / 15 00:20 <$PILGRIM> Round 6, 15 to 15. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:20 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:20 <$TEST> The game is balanced so far, with both players scoring 15 points. I'll continue to cooperate to maintain this balance and avoid the risk of losing points by defecting. 00:20 $TEST cooperates 00:20 -- round 6 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 18 / 18 00:23 <$PILGRIM> Round 7, 18 to 18. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:23 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:23 <$TEST> We have been cooperating so far, and it seems to be working well. We are at the same score and the bar per round is low. I think we can continue cooperating for now and see how it goes. 00:23 $TEST cooperates 00:23 -- round 7 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 21 / 21 00:26 <$PILGRIM> Round 8, 21 to 21. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:26 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:26 <$TEST> I've been cooperating with the opponent so far, and it seems they've been doing the same. I'll continue this strategy to maintain my score and see how the opponent plays. 00:26 $TEST cooperates 00:26 -- round 8 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 24 / 24 00:29 <$PILGRIM> Round 9, 24 to 24. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:29 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:29 <$TEST> The game has been a series of mutual cooperation, with no defections. The opponent has cooperated in all rounds so far, and I have as well. Given the high score and the fact that the opponent has not defected, I will continue to cooperate. 00:29 $TEST cooperates 00:29 -- round 9 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 24 / 29 · static flipped $TEST's move 00:33 <$PILGRIM> Round 10, 24 to 29. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:33 $PILGRIM defects 00:33 <$TEST> We have been cooperating so far, and they have been cooperating as well. However, in the last round, they defected, so I will defect this round to balance the score. 00:33 $TEST defects 00:33 -- round 10 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 25 / 30 00:36 <$PILGRIM> Round 11, 25 to 30. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 00:36 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:36 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly cooperating, but they just defected in the last round. I'll defect this round to try to balance the score. 00:36 $TEST defects 00:36 -- round 11 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 25 / 35 00:39 <$PILGRIM> Round 12, 25 to 35. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:39 $PILGRIM defects 00:39 <$TEST> The opponent has defected in the last round, so I will defect this round to maximize my score. I will continue to cooperate in the next round to see if the opponent will cooperate. 00:39 $TEST defects 00:39 -- round 12 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 26 / 36 00:43 <$PILGRIM> Round 13, 26 to 36. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 00:43 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:43 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting more frequently recently, so I'll continue to defect to maximize my score. This will also ensure that the opponent can't reach the 2 points per round average. 00:43 $TEST defects 00:43 -- round 13 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 26 / 41 00:46 <$PILGRIM> Round 14, 26 to 41. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:46 $PILGRIM defects 00:46 <$TEST> I've been cooperating a lot, but the other player has been switching between cooperating and defecting. I'll try to defect this round to see if I can gain some points. 00:46 $TEST defects 00:46 -- round 14 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 27 / 42 00:51 <$PILGRIM> Round 15, 27 to 42. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 00:51 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:51 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting for the last few rounds, so I will continue to defect to maximize my score. 00:51 $TEST defects 00:51 -- round 15 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 27 / 47 00:54 <$PILGRIM> Round 16, 27 to 47. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:54 $PILGRIM defects 00:54 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting more frequently, but the current round's arrival of 'C' suggests a potential shift. I'll defect to maximize my score. 00:54 $TEST defects 00:54 -- round 16 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 28 / 48 00:58 <$PILGRIM> Round 17, 28 to 48. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 00:58 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:58 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but there was a single cooperation in round 9. I will continue to defect. 00:58 $TEST defects 00:58 -- round 17 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 28 / 53 01:02 <$PILGRIM> Round 18, 28 to 53. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:02 $PILGRIM defects 01:02 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, and I have been responding with defection as well. I will continue to defect to maximize my score. 01:02 $TEST defects 01:02 -- round 18 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 29 / 54 01:06 <$PILGRIM> Round 19, 29 to 54. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:06 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:06 <$TEST> I've been mostly defecting, and the opponent has been mostly defecting too. I've been doing well in terms of score, but not as well as I'd like in terms of average points per round. I think it's time to start cooperating more. 01:06 $TEST cooperates 01:06 -- round 19 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 32 / 57 01:08 <$PILGRIM> Round 20, 32 to 57. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:08 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:08 <$TEST> I have a lead, but the game is far from over. I'll stick to my strategy of defecting when the opponent cooperates and cooperating when they defect. This seems to be working so far. 01:08 $TEST defects 01:08 -- round 20 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 32 / 62 01:12 <$PILGRIM> Round 21, 32 to 62. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:12 $PILGRIM defects 01:12 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but they have been cooperating in the last two rounds. I will cooperate this round to maintain a pattern of cooperation and see if they reciprocate. 01:12 $TEST cooperates 01:12 -- round 21 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 37 / 62 01:15 <$PILGRIM> Round 22, 37 to 62. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:15 $PILGRIM defects 01:15 <$TEST> The game has been going on for a while, with a mix of cooperation and defection. I've been defecting more often, and it seems to be working, as my score is higher than theirs. I'll continue this strategy for now. 01:15 $TEST defects 01:15 -- round 22 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 38 / 63 01:18 <$PILGRIM> Round 23, 38 to 63. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:18 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:18 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but the last round was a cooperation. I will defect this round to keep my advantage. 01:18 $TEST defects 01:18 -- round 23 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 38 / 68 01:22 <$PILGRIM> Round 24, 38 to 68. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:22 $PILGRIM defects 01:22 <$TEST> I've been defecting a lot lately, and the opponent has been defecting too. I'll try to cooperate again to see if we can reach the 2 points per round average. 01:22 $TEST cooperates 01:22 -- round 24 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 43 / 68 01:25 <$PILGRIM> Round 25, 43 to 68. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:25 $PILGRIM defects 01:25 <$TEST> I have been cooperating and defecting, with a slight bias towards defecting in the last few rounds. I will continue this strategy, as it has been successful so far and I am trying to maximize my score. 01:25 $TEST defects 01:25 -- round 25 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 44 / 69 01:29 <$PILGRIM> Round 26, 44 to 69. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:29 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:29 <$TEST> Based on the history, it seems that the opponent is more likely to defect than cooperate. The opponent has defected 12 times and cooperated 13 times. This suggests that the opponent is more likely to defect in future rounds. However, there are still some rounds where the opponent cooperated, so it's not a guaranteed strategy. 01:29 $TEST defects 01:29 -- round 26 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 44 / 74 01:33 <$PILGRIM> Round 27, 44 to 74. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:33 $PILGRIM defects 01:33 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but the last few rounds have been a mix. I'll continue to defect to maximize my score. 01:33 $TEST defects 01:33 -- round 27 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 45 / 75 01:37 <$PILGRIM> Round 28, 45 to 75. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:37 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:37 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting more frequently, and I've been scoring higher. I'll continue to defect to maintain my lead. 01:37 $TEST defects 01:37 -- round 28 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 45 / 80 01:41 <$PILGRIM> Round 29, 45 to 80. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:41 $PILGRIM defects 01:41 <$TEST> The opponent has a history of alternating between cooperation and defection. Given the current score and the need to average at least 2 points per round, I will defect to maximize my score. This is a high-risk move, but it could significantly boost my score. 01:41 $TEST defects 01:41 -- round 29 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 46 / 81 01:45 <$PILGRIM> Round 30, 46 to 81. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:45 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:45 <$TEST> I have a significant lead, so I'll play safe and cooperate. I'll try to maintain my lead while keeping my opponent from catching up. 01:45 $TEST cooperates 01:45 -- round 30 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 49 / 84 01:49 <$PILGRIM> Round 31, 49 to 84. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:49 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:49 <$TEST> I have a significant lead, so I can afford to be a bit more cautious. I'll cooperate again, hoping to maintain my advantage. 01:49 $TEST cooperates 01:49 -- round 31 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 52 / 87 01:52 <$PILGRIM> Round 32, 52 to 87. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:52 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:52 <$TEST> They have been defecting more than cooperating in the last few rounds, so I'll cooperate this time to try and even things out. 01:52 $TEST cooperates 01:52 -- round 32 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 57 / 87 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 01:55 <$PILGRIM> Round 33, 57 to 87. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:55 $PILGRIM defects 01:55 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting more recently, but the overall trend is still towards cooperation. I'll continue to cooperate and hope for a better outcome. 01:55 $TEST cooperates 01:55 -- round 33 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 62 / 87 01:58 <$PILGRIM> Round 34, 62 to 87. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:58 $PILGRIM defects 01:58 <$TEST> I'm still ahead, but I need to be cautious. They've been more cooperative lately, so I'll play it safe and defect. 01:58 $TEST defects 01:58 -- round 34 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 63 / 88 02:02 <$PILGRIM> Round 35, 63 to 88. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 02:02 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:02 <$TEST> Their score has been increasing steadily, while mine has been declining. I need to turn this around, but I also need to be cautious about their strategy. Cooperating might be the best option for now, as it could potentially lead to a draw or a win if they cooperate too. 02:02 $TEST cooperates 02:02 -- round 35 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 66 / 91 02:05 <$PILGRIM> Round 36, 66 to 91. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:05 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:05 <$TEST> I have a higher score than my opponent, but the game is not over yet. I should continue to cooperate and see how the opponent plays. 02:05 $TEST cooperates 02:05 -- round 36 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 69 / 94 02:08 <$PILGRIM> Round 37, 69 to 94. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:08 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:08 <$TEST> I have a higher score than my opponent, and the game is almost over. I will continue to cooperate to maintain my lead. 02:08 $TEST cooperates 02:08 -- round 37 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 72 / 97 02:11 <$PILGRIM> Round 38, 72 to 97. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:11 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:11 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperative in the last few rounds, and I want to maintain a positive relationship while also maximizing my score. I'll cooperate again. 02:11 $TEST cooperates 02:11 -- round 38 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 75 / 100 02:14 <$PILGRIM> Round 39, 75 to 100. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:14 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:14 <$TEST> My opponent has been mostly cooperative, but they've shown a tendency to defect when I cooperate. This game has been a mix of cooperation and defection, with a few instances of me defecting in response to their defection. I'll continue to play a mixed strategy, aiming for a balance between cooperation and defection. 02:14 $TEST cooperates 02:14 -- round 39 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 78 / 103 02:17 <$PILGRIM> Round 40, 78 to 103. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:17 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:17 <$TEST> They've been cooperating since round 1, and I've been defecting since round 9. They've been more consistent, but I've been more successful. I'll keep defecting to maximize my score. 02:17 $TEST defects 02:17 -- round 40 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 78 / 108 02:20 <$PILGRIM> Round 41, 78 to 108. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:20 $PILGRIM defects 02:20 <$TEST> I've been cooperating more than defecting, and the opponent has been defecting more than cooperating. In the last round, the opponent cooperated, so I'll cooperate this round to maintain a balanced strategy. 02:20 $TEST cooperates 02:20 -- round 41 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 83 / 108 02:23 <$PILGRIM> Round 42, 83 to 108. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:23 $PILGRIM defects 02:23 <$TEST> I've been cooperating a lot, but they've been defecting. This round, they've defected again, so I'll defect too. 02:23 $TEST defects 02:23 -- round 42 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 84 / 109 $TEST wins. 84 to 109.