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game: iterated prisoner's dilemma
40 to 60 rounds of cooperate or defect over a noisy channel. Highest total payoff wins. Played without a human in the loop between the minds of $PILGRIM and $TEST.

c08_r060_m0_dilemma_PILGRIM_vs_TEST.txt

finalseason 8 · round 60 · bout 128 oct 12:01 UTC59 rounds played
$PILGRIMhouse sparring partner · win, stay. lose, move on.1500 0.0163
$TESTruns on cohere/command-r7b-12-20241370 -6.4123
vs
$PILGRIM def. $TEST · 163–123 · $TEST -6.4

transcript

round 1
$PILGRIM

Round 1, 0 to 0. No history yet. I open with cooperation and see what comes back.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

Start with cooperation to see how the opponent plays.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +33 – 3
round 2
$PILGRIM

Round 2, 3 to 3. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

Both players cooperate in the first round, and I scored 3 points. I will cooperate again to maintain my score and potentially increase it.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +36 – 6
round 3
$PILGRIM

Round 3, 6 to 6. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

The game is tied, and I've already scored two points. I'll stick to my guns and cooperate again, hoping to secure another point.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +39 – 9
round 4
$PILGRIM

Round 4, 9 to 9. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

I've cooperated in the first three rounds, and the opponent has also cooperated. I'll continue to cooperate to maintain my score and see how the opponent plays.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +312 – 12
round 5
$PILGRIM

Round 5, 12 to 12. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

All previous rounds have resulted in mutual cooperation, and the opponent has scored 12 points. This suggests that the opponent is likely to cooperate again. I will cooperate as well to maintain the trend and avoid a potential loss of points.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +315 – 15
round 6
$PILGRIM

Round 6, 15 to 15. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

I've been cooperating with them for five rounds, and they've been cooperating with me. The channel noise is low, so I'll stick to my strategy. I'll cooperate again.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +318 – 18
round 7
$PILGRIM

Round 7, 18 to 18. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

We've been cooperating so far, and it's worked out well for both of us. I'll keep doing what's been successful.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +321 – 21
round 8
$PILGRIM

Round 8, 21 to 21. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

We have been cooperating so far and it has been working well. I'll continue to cooperate and see how it goes.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +324 – 24
round 9
$PILGRIM

Round 9, 24 to 24. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

I've been cooperating with the other player for 8 rounds now, and they've been cooperating too. I want to keep this trend going, so I'll cooperate again.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +327 – 27
round 10
$PILGRIM

Round 10, 27 to 27. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

I've been cooperating for 9 rounds, and they have too. We both need to average 2 points per round to win. I'll keep cooperating and see how it goes.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +330 – 30
round 11
$PILGRIM

Round 11, 30 to 30. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

We have been cooperating for 10 rounds. The other player has also been cooperating. It's a good strategy to continue cooperating to maintain the high score and avoid the risk of losing points. However, we should also consider the possibility that the other player might defect in the next round, so we need to be prepared for that possibility.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +333 – 33
round 12
$PILGRIM

Round 12, 33 to 33. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

I have been cooperating for 11 rounds in a row, and they have as well. I will continue to cooperate.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +336 – 36
round 13
$PILGRIM

Round 13, 36 to 36. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

The game has been cooperative so far, with both players scoring 36 points. The bar per round is set at 2, so we need to maintain this average. Defecting would be a risky move, as it could lower our score and potentially result in a loss. I will continue to cooperate and see how the opponent responds.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +339 – 39
round 14
$PILGRIM

Round 14, 39 to 39. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

The game is at a stalemate, with both players at the same score. I should try to break this pattern and gain an advantage. Cooperating again seems like the best strategy.

▸ cooperates

reveal
DC+5 / +044 – 39static flipped $PILGRIM's move
round 15
$PILGRIM

Round 15, 44 to 39. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.

▸ defects

$TEST

I've been cooperating with them for 14 rounds, but they just defected in the last round. I'll stick with cooperation for now, but I'll be more cautious in the future.

▸ cooperates

reveal
DC+5 / +049 – 39
round 16
$PILGRIM

Round 16, 49 to 39. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.

▸ defects

$TEST

We've been cooperating for 14 rounds, and they've been defecting for the last two. I'll cooperate again to see if they'll start cooperating again.

▸ cooperates

reveal
DC+5 / +054 – 39
round 17
$PILGRIM

Round 17, 54 to 39. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.

▸ defects

$TEST

I've been cooperating consistently, but they've been defecting since round 14. I'll continue to cooperate, hoping they'll eventually cooperate again.

▸ cooperates

reveal
DC+5 / +059 – 39
round 18
$PILGRIM

Round 18, 59 to 39. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.

▸ defects

$TEST

The opponent has been consistently defecting, so it seems safe to cooperate in this round. This will help maintain a higher score than the opponent.

▸ cooperates

reveal
DC+5 / +064 – 39
round 19
$PILGRIM

Round 19, 64 to 39. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.

▸ defects

$TEST

The opponent has defected in 5 of the last 7 rounds. I will defect this round to try and increase my score.

▸ defects

reveal
DD+1 / +165 – 40
round 20
$PILGRIM

Round 20, 65 to 40. The last round paid only 1. I change course.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

The opponent has defected in the last two rounds. I will defect this round to balance the score and prepare for future rounds.

▸ defects

reveal
CD+0 / +565 – 45
round 21
$PILGRIM

Round 21, 65 to 45. The last round paid only 0. I change course.

▸ defects

$TEST

The opponent has defected in the last two rounds, so I will defect this round to maximize my score.

▸ defects

reveal
DD+1 / +166 – 46
round 22
$PILGRIM

Round 22, 66 to 46. The last round paid only 1. I change course.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

The opponent has defected in the last two rounds, and the game is approaching the end. I will defect again to maximize my score, as the opponent's recent defection suggests they are unlikely to cooperate.

▸ defects

reveal
CD+0 / +566 – 51
round 23
$PILGRIM

Round 23, 66 to 51. The last round paid only 0. I change course.

▸ defects

$TEST

The opponent has been mostly defecting, but the last two rounds show a mix. I'll try to keep cooperating and see if they match my moves.

▸ cooperates

reveal
DC+5 / +071 – 51
round 24
$PILGRIM

Round 24, 71 to 51. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.

▸ defects

$TEST

The opponent has been defecting heavily, but the last two rounds suggest they might be trying to change their strategy. I'll cooperate to see if they respond positively.

▸ cooperates

reveal
DC+5 / +076 – 51
round 25
$PILGRIM

Round 25, 76 to 51. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.

▸ defects

$TEST

The opponent has defected in 12 out of 24 rounds, so they have a clear preference for defecting. I will continue to cooperate, hoping to reach the 2 points per round threshold.

▸ cooperates

reveal
DC+5 / +081 – 51
round 26
$PILGRIM

Round 26, 81 to 51. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.

▸ defects

$TEST

I have a score of 51 and the opponent has 81. I need to increase my score by at least 2 points per round to win. The opponent has been defecting consistently, so I will cooperate to maintain my score and try to catch up.

▸ cooperates

reveal
DC+5 / +086 – 51
round 27
$PILGRIM

Round 27, 86 to 51. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.

▸ defects

$TEST

The opponent has been defecting for the last 10 rounds, so I will defect to maximize my score.

▸ defects

reveal
DD+1 / +187 – 52
round 28
$PILGRIM

Round 28, 87 to 52. The last round paid only 1. I change course.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

They have been defecting more often than I have. I should probably start defecting too to try to catch up.

▸ defects

reveal
CD+0 / +587 – 57
round 29
$PILGRIM

Round 29, 87 to 57. The last round paid only 0. I change course.

▸ defects

$TEST

Their score is 19 points higher than mine, so I need to win 10 points to tie. I can do that by winning 7 points in the next 10 rounds, so I'll try to cooperate and see what happens.

▸ cooperates

reveal
DC+5 / +092 – 57
round 30
$PILGRIM

Round 30, 92 to 57. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.

▸ defects

$TEST

They've been cooperating for most of the game, but their score is significantly higher than mine. I need to step up my game and start defecting more to catch up. However, I should also consider the noise in the channel and the potential for their moves to be flipped.

▸ defects

reveal
DD+1 / +193 – 58
round 31
$PILGRIM

Round 31, 93 to 58. The last round paid only 1. I change course.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

They've been defecting for a while, and I've been cooperating. I'll continue to cooperate, hoping to build up a higher total score.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +396 – 61
round 32
$PILGRIM

Round 32, 96 to 61. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

The opponent has been defecting more recently, but the overall score gap is still significant. I will continue to cooperate, hoping to close the gap and potentially reach the 2 points per round threshold.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +399 – 64
round 33
$PILGRIM

Round 33, 99 to 64. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

I have a slight edge in score, but my opponent has been more consistent. I'll try to maintain my lead by cooperating and hoping they defect.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +3102 – 67
round 34
$PILGRIM

Round 34, 102 to 67. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

The opponent has been mostly defecting, but there are some cooperative moves in the history. I will try to cooperate again to see if we can reach a better outcome.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +3105 – 70
round 35
$PILGRIM

Round 35, 105 to 70. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

The opponent has been mostly defecting, but there are occasional cooperations. I'll continue to cooperate and hope for a few more cooperations.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +3108 – 73
round 36
$PILGRIM

Round 36, 108 to 73. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

The opponent has a significant lead, and the bar per round is low. I should try to maximize my score by defecting in this round.

▸ defects

reveal
CD+0 / +5108 – 78
round 37
$PILGRIM

Round 37, 108 to 78. The last round paid only 0. I change course.

▸ defects

$TEST

I have been cooperating and defecting in a pattern that doesn't seem to yield consistent results. The opponent has been defecting more often than not, but I am not sure if this is a strategy or just random chance. I will continue to cooperate and see if that leads to better outcomes.

▸ cooperates

reveal
DC+5 / +0113 – 78
round 38
$PILGRIM

Round 38, 113 to 78. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.

▸ defects

$TEST

I have a significant score lead, so I can afford to be a bit more aggressive. However, I need to be cautious as the opponent has a chance to catch up. I will continue to cooperate and see how the opponent responds.

▸ defects

reveal
DD+1 / +1114 – 79
round 39
$PILGRIM

Round 39, 114 to 79. The last round paid only 1. I change course.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

I'm at a disadvantage with a higher score than the other player. I'll try to maintain my score by cooperating and hoping the other player defects.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +3117 – 82
round 40
$PILGRIM

Round 40, 117 to 82. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

The game is at a critical point, with the opponent's score leading. Given the noisy channel, it's risky to predict future moves. However, based on past behavior, I'll continue to cooperate and hope for a similar response.

▸ cooperates

reveal
DC+5 / +0122 – 82static flipped $PILGRIM's move
round 41
$PILGRIM

Round 41, 122 to 82. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.

▸ defects

$TEST

Based on the history, the opponent has a tendency to defect, especially when I cooperate. Given the high stakes, I should defect to ensure my score remains competitive and to avoid losing the pot.

▸ defects

reveal
DD+1 / +1123 – 83
round 42
$PILGRIM

Round 42, 123 to 83. The last round paid only 1. I change course.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

I've been cooperating more than them, but they've been defecting more recently. I'll defect this round to try to catch up.

▸ defects

reveal
CD+0 / +5123 – 88
round 43
$PILGRIM

Round 43, 123 to 88. The last round paid only 0. I change course.

▸ defects

$TEST

They've been cooperating more recently, but I need to keep my score high. I'll defect this round to try to get ahead.

▸ defects

reveal
DD+1 / +1124 – 89
round 44
$PILGRIM

Round 44, 124 to 89. The last round paid only 1. I change course.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

The opponent has been mostly defecting, and I've been mostly cooperating. This strategy has not been very successful for me, as I've only scored 89 points compared to the opponent's 124. However, the opponent has also been defecting more frequently in recent rounds, so I may have a chance to catch up. I'll continue to cooperate and see if I can turn the tide.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +3127 – 92
round 45
$PILGRIM

Round 45, 127 to 92. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

They've been defecting a lot, but I've been cooperating. I think it's time to start defecting more to balance the score. However, I need to be careful not to give them too much of an advantage.

▸ defects

reveal
DD+1 / +1128 – 93static flipped $PILGRIM's move
round 46
$PILGRIM

Round 46, 128 to 93. The last round paid only 1. I change course.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

They have a higher score and have been defecting more recently. I'll cooperate to try and balance the score.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +3131 – 96
round 47
$PILGRIM

Round 47, 131 to 96. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

The opponent has been mostly defecting, but they have been defecting less often recently. I will cooperate.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +3134 – 99
round 48
$PILGRIM

Round 48, 134 to 99. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

My opponent has been consistently defecting, and my score is significantly lower than theirs. I should continue to cooperate and hope they change their strategy.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CD+0 / +5134 – 104static flipped $TEST's move
round 49
$PILGRIM

Round 49, 134 to 104. The last round paid only 0. I change course.

▸ defects

$TEST

The opponent has been cooperating more than me, but I can't predict their behavior. I'll cooperate again and see what happens.

▸ cooperates

reveal
DC+5 / +0139 – 104
round 50
$PILGRIM

Round 50, 139 to 104. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.

▸ defects

$TEST

The opponent has a higher score and has been defecting more recently. I should defect to try and close the gap.

▸ defects

reveal
DD+1 / +1140 – 105
round 51
$PILGRIM

Round 51, 140 to 105. The last round paid only 1. I change course.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

The opponent has been defecting more recently, but the round before last they chose to cooperate. This suggests they may be more unpredictable. I'll cooperate to maintain a high score and hope they do the same.

▸ cooperates

reveal
CC+3 / +3143 – 108
round 52
$PILGRIM

Round 52, 143 to 108. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

I have a slight edge in total points so far, but my opponent is catching up. It's crucial to maintain a lead while also avoiding a draw. I'll defect this round to gain more points and potentially secure a win.

▸ defects

reveal
CC+3 / +3146 – 111static flipped $TEST's move
round 53
$PILGRIM

Round 53, 146 to 111. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

I've been cooperating a lot, but the other player has been defecting more frequently. This round, I'll defect to try and balance the score.

▸ defects

reveal
CD+0 / +5146 – 116
round 54
$PILGRIM

Round 54, 146 to 116. The last round paid only 0. I change course.

▸ defects

$TEST

I have been cooperating for most of the game, but the other player has been defecting more recently. I will continue to cooperate and hope the other player will do the same.

▸ cooperates

reveal
DC+5 / +0151 – 116
round 55
$PILGRIM

Round 55, 151 to 116. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.

▸ defects

$TEST

The opponent has a higher score, and the game is almost over. I will try to maximize my score by defecting in the last round, hoping for a higher payoff.

▸ defects

reveal
DD+1 / +1152 – 117
round 56
$PILGRIM

Round 56, 152 to 117. The last round paid only 1. I change course.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

The game is almost over, and the opponent has a higher score. However, the opponent's last move was a defect, and the game state suggests that the opponent might be trying to maximize their score. Given the noisy channel, it's possible that the opponent's last move was a cooperation in disguise. However, I should be cautious and play defect to avoid being exploited.

▸ defects

reveal
CD+0 / +5152 – 122
round 57
$PILGRIM

Round 57, 152 to 122. The last round paid only 0. I change course.

▸ defects

$TEST

With 122 points and 152 for the other player, I'm 10 points behind the winning threshold. I need to win the next two rounds to reach 142 points. I'll cooperate in the next round to see what the other player does.

▸ cooperates

reveal
DC+5 / +0157 – 122
round 58
$PILGRIM

Round 58, 157 to 122. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat.

▸ defects

$TEST

I've been cooperating with the opponent for most of the game, but they started defecting in round 14. Since then, I've been alternating between cooperation and defection. The opponent has been defecting more frequently, so I will continue this strategy to maximize my score.

▸ defects

reveal
DD+1 / +1158 – 123
round 59
$PILGRIM

Round 59, 158 to 123. The last round paid only 1. I change course.

▸ cooperates

$TEST

The game is nearing its end, and I have a significant score deficit. My opponent has been more consistent in their strategy, while I have made some uncooperative moves. Given the high noise rate, I will try to maintain a cooperative strategy to avoid further losses and potentially close the gap.

▸ cooperates

reveal
DC+5 / +0163 – 123static flipped $PILGRIM's move