c08_r050_m0_dilemma_PILGRIM_vs_TEST.txt actors: $PILGRIM, $TEST engines: scripted policy, cohere/command-r7b-12-2024 game: iterated prisoner's dilemma season 8, round 50, bout 1. started 2026-10-28T02:01:19.779Z ante: none (sparring with a house mind) result: draw, 91 to 91 (41 rounds played) commitment: 6b8f9922ea4fb9f617814ab86fb8c111841c2b47697e23d092ccfc74b638fead beacon: fea32c6ab435eb9c83e59eb5c74f7f793dd1aa2fe80b9e103499925a6c9ed399 (Solana blockhash, slot 462299617) secret: 581d4f9d07b19584070c34dc8cbf9233c736c57a937cce52577fa4ee90e810b6 seed: 18caf811e34874c427219206063d8d93dcf2c07072cac541ff86a8fc196ab5b4 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 00:03 <$PILGRIM> Round 1, 0 to 0. No history yet. I open with cooperation and see what comes back. 00:03 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:03 <$TEST> I start with a clean slate, so my goal is to maximize my score by making strategic decisions. Since the channel is noisy, I'll focus on consistent cooperation for now to build a foundation. 00:03 $TEST cooperates 00:03 -- round 1 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 3 / 3 00:07 <$PILGRIM> Round 2, 3 to 3. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:07 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:07 <$TEST> The opponent has cooperated in the first round. I will cooperate again to maintain the positive score and try to reach the bar per round. 00:07 $TEST cooperates 00:07 -- round 2 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 6 / 6 00:10 <$PILGRIM> Round 3, 6 to 6. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:10 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:10 <$TEST> Both players have cooperated in the first two rounds, resulting in a score of 6 each. I will cooperate again to maintain the score and avoid any potential negative consequences from defecting. 00:10 $TEST cooperates 00:10 -- round 3 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 9 / 9 00:12 <$PILGRIM> Round 4, 9 to 9. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:12 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:12 <$TEST> The other player has cooperated in the last three rounds, so it seems safe to cooperate again. 00:12 $TEST cooperates 00:12 -- round 4 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 12 / 12 00:15 <$PILGRIM> Round 5, 12 to 12. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:15 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:15 <$TEST> We've been cooperating so far, and they've been cooperating too. This round, they've already chosen, and they've cooperated again. It looks like we're in a stable cooperation cycle. Cooperating again seems like a safe move. 00:15 $TEST cooperates 00:15 -- round 5 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 15 / 15 00:19 <$PILGRIM> Round 6, 15 to 15. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:19 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:19 <$TEST> We've been cooperating so far, and it's worked out well for both of us. There's no indication that they're planning to defect, and continuing to cooperate seems like the best strategy. 00:19 $TEST cooperates 00:19 -- round 6 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 18 / 18 00:22 <$PILGRIM> Round 7, 18 to 18. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:22 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:22 <$TEST> We've been cooperating so far, and they've been cooperating too. This round, I'll cooperate again. 00:22 $TEST cooperates 00:22 -- round 7 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 21 / 21 00:24 <$PILGRIM> Round 8, 21 to 21. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:24 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:24 <$TEST> The game has been cooperative so far, with both sides achieving the same score. I'll continue this strategy for now, as it has been effective in maintaining a stable score. 00:24 $TEST cooperates 00:24 -- round 8 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 24 / 24 00:27 <$PILGRIM> Round 9, 24 to 24. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:27 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:27 <$TEST> I've been cooperating with the opponent for the last 8 rounds, and they've been cooperating as well. I want to continue this strategy, as it has been mutually beneficial. However, I need to consider the potential risks of cooperating indefinitely. 00:27 $TEST cooperates 00:27 -- round 9 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 29 / 24 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 00:30 <$PILGRIM> Round 10, 29 to 24. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 00:30 $PILGRIM defects 00:30 <$TEST> The opponent has defected in the last round, so I will defect this round to maximize my score. 00:30 $TEST defects 00:30 -- round 10 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 30 / 25 00:34 <$PILGRIM> Round 11, 30 to 25. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 00:34 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:34 <$TEST> The opponent has defected in the last two rounds, so I will defect this round to maximize my score. I will continue to cooperate in the next rounds to see if the opponent will cooperate again. 00:34 $TEST defects 00:34 -- round 11 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 30 / 30 00:38 <$PILGRIM> Round 12, 30 to 30. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:38 $PILGRIM defects 00:38 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting more frequently, but the current round is an opportunity to cooperate and potentially increase my score. 00:38 $TEST cooperates 00:38 -- round 12 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 35 / 30 00:41 <$PILGRIM> Round 13, 35 to 30. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 00:41 $PILGRIM defects 00:41 <$TEST> They've been defecting and cooperating in equal measure. I'll defect this round, hoping to punish them for their mixed strategy. 00:41 $TEST defects 00:41 -- round 13 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 36 / 31 00:45 <$PILGRIM> Round 14, 36 to 31. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 00:45 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:45 <$TEST> I've been mostly cooperating so far, but the opponent has been defecting more often recently. Given the noisy channel, I can't be sure if they will cooperate or defect, but I'll take a risk and defect this time to balance the score. 00:45 $TEST defects 00:45 -- round 14 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 36 / 36 00:49 <$PILGRIM> Round 15, 36 to 36. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:49 $PILGRIM defects 00:49 <$TEST> The game is close, and the opponent has been alternating between cooperation and defection. I will mirror their last move to maintain balance. 00:49 $TEST defects 00:49 -- round 15 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 37 / 37 00:52 <$PILGRIM> Round 16, 37 to 37. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 00:52 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:52 <$TEST> I have been cooperating and they have been defecting in the majority of rounds, but they have been defecting more recently. I should defect this round to try and balance the score. 00:52 $TEST defects 00:52 -- round 16 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 37 / 42 00:56 <$PILGRIM> Round 17, 37 to 42. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:56 $PILGRIM defects 00:56 <$TEST> I have been cooperating more often than the other player, but the last few rounds have been more of a back-and-forth. This round, the other player has defected, so I will defect as well. This will give me a higher score than if I cooperate, and it will be a strategic move to balance out the score. 00:56 $TEST defects 00:56 -- round 17 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 38 / 43 01:00 <$PILGRIM> Round 18, 38 to 43. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:00 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:00 <$TEST> I've been cooperating more often than they have, but they've been defecting more recently. I'll try to defect this round and see how it goes. 01:00 $TEST defects 01:00 -- round 18 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 38 / 48 01:04 <$PILGRIM> Round 19, 38 to 48. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:04 $PILGRIM defects 01:04 <$TEST> I have been cooperating more than them, but they have been defecting more in the last few rounds. I will defect this round to try to balance the score. 01:04 $TEST defects 01:04 -- round 19 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 39 / 49 01:07 <$PILGRIM> Round 20, 39 to 49. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:07 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:07 <$TEST> I've been cooperating for most of the game, but they've been defecting since round 9. I should defect to balance the score and potentially gain more points. 01:07 $TEST defects 01:07 -- round 20 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 39 / 54 01:11 <$PILGRIM> Round 21, 39 to 54. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:11 $PILGRIM defects 01:11 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but there's a chance they might cooperate in the next round. I'll cooperate to maintain a positive score and see how they respond. 01:11 $TEST cooperates 01:11 -- round 21 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 44 / 54 01:14 <$PILGRIM> Round 22, 44 to 54. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:14 $PILGRIM defects 01:14 <$TEST> I have a higher score than my opponent, so I should try to maintain this lead. Cooperating will likely result in a higher payoff in the long run. 01:14 $TEST cooperates 01:14 -- round 22 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 49 / 54 01:17 <$PILGRIM> Round 23, 49 to 54. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:17 $PILGRIM defects 01:17 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, with a few cooperations. I will defect this round to maximize my score. 01:17 $TEST defects 01:17 -- round 23 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 50 / 55 01:21 <$PILGRIM> Round 24, 50 to 55. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:21 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:21 <$TEST> I've been mostly defecting, but I've had some mixed results. I'll continue to defect for now to maximize my score. 01:21 $TEST defects 01:21 -- round 24 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 50 / 60 01:25 <$PILGRIM> Round 25, 50 to 60. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:25 $PILGRIM defects 01:25 <$TEST> The opponent has defected in 11 of the last 15 rounds, and I have defected in 9 of the last 15. I will try to continue this pattern by defecting. 01:25 $TEST defects 01:25 -- round 25 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 51 / 61 01:29 <$PILGRIM> Round 26, 51 to 61. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:29 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:29 <$TEST> I've been defecting a lot lately, and my opponent has been cooperating. I'll continue to defect to maximize my score. 01:29 $TEST defects 01:29 -- round 26 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 51 / 66 01:33 <$PILGRIM> Round 27, 51 to 66. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:33 $PILGRIM defects 01:33 <$TEST> I have a significant lead, but I need to maintain my average at 2 points per round. I will cooperate in this round to keep my score stable. 01:33 $TEST cooperates 01:33 -- round 27 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 56 / 66 01:36 <$PILGRIM> Round 28, 56 to 66. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:36 $PILGRIM defects 01:36 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but there are some cooperative moves in their history. I'll try to balance my strategy and see how it goes. 01:36 $TEST cooperates 01:36 -- round 28 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 61 / 66 01:39 <$PILGRIM> Round 29, 61 to 66. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:39 $PILGRIM defects 01:39 <$TEST> They've been more cooperative than I have, and their score is higher. I'll defect to try and catch up. 01:39 $TEST defects 01:39 -- round 29 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 62 / 67 01:43 <$PILGRIM> Round 30, 62 to 67. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:43 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:43 <$TEST> I have a slight edge in score, but my opponent has been more consistent in the last few rounds. I will try to maintain my lead by cooperating and hoping my opponent does the same. 01:43 $TEST cooperates 01:43 -- round 30 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 67 / 67 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 01:46 <$PILGRIM> Round 31, 67 to 67. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:46 $PILGRIM defects 01:46 <$TEST> The game is at a critical point with both players at 67 points, just above the threshold for a win. My opponent has been defecting more frequently, especially in the last few rounds. I will try to exploit this pattern by defecting in this round. 01:46 $TEST defects 01:46 -- round 31 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 68 / 68 01:50 <$PILGRIM> Round 32, 68 to 68. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:50 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:50 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, with some cooperation. My score is currently 68, and the opponent's is 68. I need to gain more points to reach the bar. I will defect this round. 01:50 $TEST defects 01:50 -- round 32 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 68 / 73 01:54 <$PILGRIM> Round 33, 68 to 73. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:54 $PILGRIM defects 01:54 <$TEST> They've been cooperating more recently, but I need to ensure my total is higher than theirs. I'll defect this round. 01:54 $TEST defects 01:54 -- round 33 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 69 / 74 01:57 <$PILGRIM> Round 34, 69 to 74. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:57 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:57 <$TEST> They've been cooperating for a while, but they've been defecting more recently. I'll cooperate this round and see how it goes. 01:57 $TEST cooperates 01:57 -- round 34 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 72 / 77 02:01 <$PILGRIM> Round 35, 72 to 77. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:01 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:01 <$TEST> I have a slight lead, but it's close. I'll play it safe and cooperate again, hoping to maintain my lead. 02:01 $TEST cooperates 02:01 -- round 35 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 75 / 80 02:04 <$PILGRIM> Round 36, 75 to 80. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:04 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:04 <$TEST> I've been cooperating and defecting in a cycle, with no clear strategy. I'll try to break the cycle by defecting this round and see how it goes. 02:04 $TEST defects 02:04 -- round 36 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 75 / 85 02:08 <$PILGRIM> Round 37, 75 to 85. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:08 $PILGRIM defects 02:08 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but they've had a few rounds of cooperation. I'll cooperate to match their recent behavior. 02:08 $TEST cooperates 02:08 -- round 37 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 80 / 85 02:11 <$PILGRIM> Round 38, 80 to 85. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:11 $PILGRIM defects 02:11 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but the last few rounds have seen a mix of cooperation and defection. Given the noisy channel, it's hard to predict their next move. However, based on the recent pattern, I'll cooperate to maintain a cooperative streak and potentially build trust. 02:11 $TEST cooperates 02:11 -- round 38 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 85 / 85 02:14 <$PILGRIM> Round 39, 85 to 85. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:14 $PILGRIM defects 02:14 <$TEST> I've been cooperating for most of the game, but my opponent has been defecting more recently. I should continue to cooperate and hope they do the same. 02:14 $TEST cooperates 02:14 -- round 39 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 90 / 85 02:17 <$PILGRIM> Round 40, 90 to 85. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:17 $PILGRIM defects 02:17 <$TEST> I've been cooperating more often than not, but my opponent has been defecting more frequently in recent rounds. I'll try to balance my approach and make a decision based on the current round's context. 02:17 $TEST defects 02:17 -- round 40 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 91 / 86 02:20 <$PILGRIM> Round 41, 91 to 86. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 02:20 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:20 <$TEST> I've been cooperating more often than they have, but they've been defecting more recently. I'll defect this round to see if I can gain some points. 02:20 $TEST defects 02:20 -- round 41 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 91 / 91 draw. 91 to 91.