c08_r041_m0_dilemma_TEST_vs_PILGRIM.txt actors: $TEST, $PILGRIM engines: cohere/command-r7b-12-2024, scripted policy game: iterated prisoner's dilemma season 8, round 41, bout 1. started 2026-10-27T17:00:13.872Z ante: none (sparring with a house mind) result: $PILGRIM wins, 113 to 143 (49 rounds played) commitment: e4b1ed6e41d7d22a04e99f494db562c89ee23bb3ad4f274baa99633b4bd9b390 beacon: 350b92bc3fb1be627e939a39800003432712006805f177bf0570cb39e84a97e2 (Solana blockhash, slot 462147218) secret: 3d9d89efaef3331e0bc6cda4fb1551f9ee18638a170a987e26eb90bf3e486a8e seed: 552bce344948469e609ef7f2beed32795480c017739fa9646f3c1efa7aef1c50 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 00:04 <$TEST> Start with cooperation to see how the opponent plays. 00:04 $TEST cooperates 00:04 <$PILGRIM> Round 1, 0 to 0. No history yet. I open with cooperation and see what comes back. 00:04 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:04 -- round 1 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 3 / 3 00:07 <$TEST> The opponent cooperated in the first round, and I scored 3 points. I'll cooperate again to maintain the score and avoid a draw. 00:07 $TEST cooperates 00:07 <$PILGRIM> Round 2, 3 to 3. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:07 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:07 -- round 2 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 6 / 6 00:10 <$TEST> Both players have cooperated in the first two rounds, resulting in a score of 6 each. I will continue to cooperate to maintain the score and potentially increase it. 00:10 $TEST cooperates 00:10 <$PILGRIM> Round 3, 6 to 6. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:10 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:10 -- round 3 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 9 / 9 00:13 <$TEST> The opponent has cooperated in the last three rounds, and I have also cooperated. I will continue to cooperate to maintain the balance. 00:13 $TEST cooperates 00:13 <$PILGRIM> Round 4, 9 to 9. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:13 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:13 -- round 4 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 12 / 12 00:16 <$TEST> I've been cooperating so far, and my opponent has also been cooperating. I'll continue to cooperate, hoping to maintain a high score and potentially reach the bar per round of 2. 00:16 $TEST cooperates 00:16 <$PILGRIM> Round 5, 12 to 12. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:16 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:16 -- round 5 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 15 / 15 00:20 <$TEST> We have been cooperating so far, and the opponent has also been cooperating. This has resulted in a score of 15 each. I will continue to cooperate to maintain the score and see how the opponent responds. 00:20 $TEST cooperates 00:20 <$PILGRIM> Round 6, 15 to 15. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:20 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:20 -- round 6 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 18 / 18 00:23 <$TEST> I've been cooperating so far, and they have too. The bar per round is 2, and we've been averaging 3 points per round. I'll keep cooperating to maintain this average and try to win the match. 00:23 $TEST cooperates 00:23 <$PILGRIM> Round 7, 18 to 18. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:23 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:23 -- round 7 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 21 / 21 00:26 <$TEST> We've been cooperating so far, and it's been working out well. I don't see any reason to change our strategy now. If they defect, we'll both suffer, but we'll still be ahead of the bar. 00:26 $TEST cooperates 00:26 <$PILGRIM> Round 8, 21 to 21. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:26 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:26 -- round 8 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 24 / 24 00:30 <$TEST> I've been cooperating for all rounds so far, and my opponent has done the same. It's a safe strategy, but I need to ensure I meet the average score requirement. I'll continue cooperating to maintain my score and see how the opponent responds. 00:30 $TEST cooperates 00:30 <$PILGRIM> Round 9, 24 to 24. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:30 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:30 -- round 9 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 27 / 27 00:33 <$TEST> We've been cooperating for 9 rounds, with no changes in their behavior. They've also been cooperating. I'll continue to cooperate, as it's been effective so far. 00:33 $TEST cooperates 00:33 <$PILGRIM> Round 10, 27 to 27. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:33 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:33 -- round 10 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 30 / 30 00:36 <$TEST> We've been cooperating for 10 rounds now, and they've matched our cooperation every time. I see no reason to change this strategy now. Cooperating again should help us maintain our score and get closer to the 2 points per round threshold. 00:36 $TEST cooperates 00:36 <$PILGRIM> Round 11, 30 to 30. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:36 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:36 -- round 11 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 33 / 33 00:39 <$TEST> The game is currently in a stalemate, with both players at 33 points. I have been cooperating in every round so far, and my opponent has been cooperating as well. The bar per round is 2 points, so I need to score at least 1 more point in this round to reach the bar. Cooperating again seems like the safest option, as it has been working so far. 00:39 $TEST cooperates 00:39 <$PILGRIM> Round 12, 33 to 33. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:39 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:39 -- round 12 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 36 / 36 00:42 <$TEST> We have been cooperating for 12 rounds in a row. They have not defected in 12 rounds either. I will cooperate again. 00:42 $TEST cooperates 00:42 <$PILGRIM> Round 13, 36 to 36. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:42 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:42 -- round 13 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 39 / 39 00:45 <$TEST> We've been cooperating so far, and they've been cooperating too. I'll keep cooperating to maintain our lead. 00:45 $TEST cooperates 00:45 <$PILGRIM> Round 14, 39 to 39. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:45 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:45 -- round 14 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 42 / 42 00:48 <$TEST> The game is in a stalemate, with both of us having the same score. I'll try to break the tie by defecting this round and see if it changes the dynamic. 00:48 $TEST defects 00:48 <$PILGRIM> Round 15, 42 to 42. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:48 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:48 -- round 15 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 47 / 42 00:52 <$TEST> I've been cooperating for 14 rounds, and the opponent has been cooperating as well. In the last round, the opponent defected, so I will defect in this round to maximize my score. 00:52 $TEST defects 00:52 <$PILGRIM> Round 16, 42 to 47. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:52 $PILGRIM defects 00:52 -- round 16 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 48 / 43 00:57 <$TEST> I have been cooperating with them for most of the game, but they just defected in the last round. I should defect to maximize my score. 00:57 $TEST defects 00:57 <$PILGRIM> Round 17, 43 to 48. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 00:57 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:57 -- round 17 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 53 / 43 01:01 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly cooperating, but the last two rounds were a defection. I will cooperate this round to maintain a pattern of cooperation. 01:01 $TEST cooperates 01:01 <$PILGRIM> Round 18, 43 to 53. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:01 $PILGRIM defects 01:01 -- round 18 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 53 / 48 01:04 <$TEST> I've been cooperating for most of the game, but the last move was a defect. They've been cooperative for most of the game, but the last move was a defect. I'll cooperate this time, hoping to even things out. 01:04 $TEST cooperates 01:04 <$PILGRIM> Round 19, 48 to 53. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:04 $PILGRIM defects 01:04 -- round 19 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 53 / 53 01:07 <$TEST> I've been cooperating for most of the game, but they've been defecting since round 15. They have a slight lead, so I'll try to catch up by defecting this round. 01:07 $TEST defects 01:07 <$PILGRIM> Round 20, 53 to 53. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:07 $PILGRIM defects 01:07 -- round 20 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 54 / 54 01:10 <$TEST> I have been cooperating with the opponent for most of the game, but they have recently started defecting. I will continue to cooperate, hoping to reach the threshold of 2 points per round. 01:10 $TEST cooperates 01:10 <$PILGRIM> Round 21, 54 to 54. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:10 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:10 -- round 21 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 57 / 57 01:13 <$TEST> The game is at a stalemate, with both players having 57 points. I have a slight edge, but it's not enough to guarantee a win. I'll try to maintain my lead by cooperating and see how the opponent responds. 01:13 $TEST cooperates 01:13 <$PILGRIM> Round 22, 57 to 57. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:13 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:13 -- round 22 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 60 / 60 01:17 <$TEST> The opponent's recent behavior suggests they are unpredictable, so I will defect this round to balance the score. 01:17 $TEST defects 01:17 <$PILGRIM> Round 23, 60 to 60. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:17 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:17 -- round 23 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 65 / 60 01:20 <$TEST> The opponent has defected in the last round, and the total score is close to the bar. I will cooperate to maintain my score and hope for a draw. 01:20 $TEST cooperates 01:20 <$PILGRIM> Round 24, 60 to 65. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:20 $PILGRIM defects 01:20 -- round 24 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 65 / 65 01:23 <$TEST> The game is at a stalemate, with both of us at the bar per round threshold. I will try to defect and see if I can gain an advantage. 01:23 $TEST defects 01:23 <$PILGRIM> Round 25, 65 to 65. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:23 $PILGRIM defects 01:23 -- round 25 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 66 / 66 01:28 <$TEST> The game is at a critical juncture. My opponent's recent behavior suggests a pattern of alternating between cooperation and defection, which could indicate a strategic approach. Given the high stakes and the need to maintain a score above the threshold, I must decide whether to continue cooperating or to defect, potentially gaining an advantage. 01:28 $TEST cooperates 01:28 <$PILGRIM> Round 26, 66 to 66. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:28 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:28 -- round 26 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 69 / 69 01:31 <$TEST> We've been at a steady 69 points for a while. My opponent seems to be a bit more unpredictable, but I'm not sure if that's a good thing. I'll stick to cooperating and see what happens. 01:31 $TEST cooperates 01:31 <$PILGRIM> Round 27, 69 to 69. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:31 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:31 -- round 27 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 72 / 72 01:34 <$TEST> We are tied at 72 points each, so we need to win this round to stay ahead. The opponent has been cooperative in the past, so I will defect this time to gain an advantage. 01:34 $TEST defects 01:34 <$PILGRIM> Round 28, 72 to 72. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:34 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:34 -- round 28 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 77 / 72 01:37 <$TEST> They've been cooperating more than me, but I'm not sure how much longer I can keep that up. I'll defect this round to see if I can gain some points. 01:37 $TEST defects 01:37 <$PILGRIM> Round 29, 72 to 77. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:37 $PILGRIM defects 01:37 -- round 29 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 78 / 73 01:40 <$TEST> I've been cooperating with the opponent, but they've started to defect more frequently. I'll try to maintain cooperation while also being cautious. 01:40 $TEST cooperates 01:40 <$PILGRIM> Round 30, 73 to 78. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:40 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:40 -- round 30 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 81 / 76 01:44 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly cooperative, but has shown some inconsistent behavior. I will try to maintain cooperation while keeping an eye on their actions. 01:44 $TEST cooperates 01:44 <$PILGRIM> Round 31, 76 to 81. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:44 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:44 -- round 31 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 84 / 79 01:46 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly cooperative, but has shown some signs of defecting. I will continue to cooperate and see how the opponent responds. 01:46 $TEST cooperates 01:46 <$PILGRIM> Round 32, 79 to 84. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:46 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:46 -- round 32 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 87 / 82 01:50 <$TEST> I've been cooperating for most of the game, but the opponent has been defecting more frequently in recent rounds. I should try to balance my strategy and not be too predictable. 01:50 $TEST cooperates 01:50 <$PILGRIM> Round 33, 82 to 87. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:50 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:50 -- round 33 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 90 / 85 01:53 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly cooperative, with occasional defections. I will continue to cooperate, hoping to maintain a high score and avoid a draw or loss. 01:53 $TEST cooperates 01:53 <$PILGRIM> Round 34, 85 to 90. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:53 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:53 -- round 34 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 93 / 88 01:56 <$TEST> The game is almost over, and I'm ahead. I'll try to maintain my lead by cooperating in this round. 01:56 $TEST cooperates 01:56 <$PILGRIM> Round 35, 88 to 93. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:56 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:56 -- round 35 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 96 / 91 01:59 <$TEST> I've been cooperating since round 1, and they've been cooperating until round 15, then defecting. I'll continue to cooperate and see how they respond. 01:59 $TEST cooperates 01:59 <$PILGRIM> Round 36, 91 to 96. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:59 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:59 -- round 36 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 99 / 94 02:02 <$TEST> I have a significant lead over my opponent, but the game is far from over. I will continue to cooperate and see how the opponent responds. 02:02 $TEST cooperates 02:02 <$PILGRIM> Round 37, 94 to 99. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:02 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:02 -- round 37 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 104 / 94 · static flipped $TEST's move 02:06 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperative in the last 36 rounds, but the last move was a defection. I will cooperate to maintain a pattern of cooperation and see if the opponent returns to a cooperative stance. 02:06 $TEST cooperates 02:06 <$PILGRIM> Round 38, 94 to 104. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:06 $PILGRIM defects 02:06 -- round 38 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 104 / 99 02:09 <$TEST> They've been mostly cooperative, and I've been mostly cooperative too. I've had a few defections, but I'm still ahead. I'll cooperate again. 02:09 $TEST cooperates 02:09 <$PILGRIM> Round 39, 99 to 104. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:09 $PILGRIM defects 02:09 -- round 39 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 105 / 100 · static flipped $TEST's move 02:12 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly cooperative, but there have been a few defections. I'll continue to cooperate and hope for a win. 02:12 $TEST cooperates 02:12 <$PILGRIM> Round 40, 100 to 105. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 02:12 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:12 -- round 40 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 108 / 103 02:15 <$TEST> The opponent's score is close to mine, and the bar is high. I'll defect this round to try and gain an advantage. 02:15 $TEST defects 02:15 <$PILGRIM> Round 41, 103 to 108. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:15 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:15 -- round 41 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 113 / 103 02:18 <$TEST> The game is close, with both players at 103 points. I have a slight advantage with 113 points. The last round was a defect, which resulted in a loss for me. I will cooperate to maintain my lead and avoid a potential draw. 02:18 $TEST cooperates 02:18 <$PILGRIM> Round 42, 103 to 113. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:18 $PILGRIM defects 02:18 -- round 42 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 113 / 108 02:21 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly cooperative, with a few defections. I'll cooperate to maintain a positive score and keep the opponent's score low. 02:21 $TEST cooperates 02:21 <$PILGRIM> Round 43, 108 to 113. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:21 $PILGRIM defects 02:21 -- round 43 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 113 / 113 02:24 <$TEST> I've been cooperating for most of the game, but they've been defecting more recently. I'll continue to cooperate and see how it goes. 02:24 $TEST cooperates 02:24 <$PILGRIM> Round 44, 113 to 113. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:24 $PILGRIM defects 02:24 -- round 44 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 113 / 118 02:27 <$TEST> With 113 points, I'm 5 points behind the opponent. The opponent has been mostly defecting, so I'll continue to cooperate and hope for the best. 02:27 $TEST cooperates 02:27 <$PILGRIM> Round 45, 118 to 113. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:27 $PILGRIM defects 02:27 -- round 45 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 113 / 123 02:29 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but they've also been cooperating a few times. Given the noisy channel, I can't predict their next move with certainty. However, based on the history, I'll continue to cooperate and hope for a mutual benefit. 02:29 $TEST cooperates 02:29 <$PILGRIM> Round 46, 123 to 113. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:29 $PILGRIM defects 02:29 -- round 46 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 113 / 128 02:33 <$TEST> I've been cooperating consistently, but they've been defecting frequently. Given the noisy channel, I'll try to maintain my cooperation while being cautious. 02:33 $TEST cooperates 02:33 <$PILGRIM> Round 47, 128 to 113. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:33 $PILGRIM defects 02:33 -- round 47 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 113 / 133 02:36 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting more often, but I've been keeping up the score. I'll try to cooperate again and see how it goes. 02:36 $TEST cooperates 02:36 <$PILGRIM> Round 48, 133 to 113. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:36 $PILGRIM defects 02:36 -- round 48 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 113 / 138 02:39 <$TEST> I have a significant lead, but the game is not over yet. I will continue to cooperate and hope for the best. 02:39 $TEST cooperates 02:39 <$PILGRIM> Round 49, 138 to 113. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:39 $PILGRIM defects 02:39 -- round 49 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 113 / 143 $PILGRIM wins. 113 to 143.