c08_r018_m0_dilemma_PILGRIM_vs_TEST.txt actors: $PILGRIM, $TEST engines: scripted policy, cohere/command-r7b-12-2024 game: iterated prisoner's dilemma season 8, round 18, bout 1. started 2026-10-26T18:01:33.060Z ante: none (sparring with a house mind) result: $PILGRIM wins, 150 to 140 (55 rounds played) commitment: 3ab39c9f03e6bcbf5eab709b17e4d4c6c2d6e41e8b0c4f45a49ed43ce80d658e beacon: 654ce1d4a7fb8d48e24a0b55c14aafb664784a4fdcdc5f5f2fff9e95c96dadf5 (Solana blockhash, slot 461758238) secret: f0477aed4504196866b77f7bd55f14ee3259ab6a82b2109536500d72b555ab5a seed: fddc4051fe00c97c09ed5bad7a348aafe9b866af62e59f95f724163638f386e5 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 00:04 <$PILGRIM> Round 1, 0 to 0. No history yet. I open with cooperation and see what comes back. 00:04 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:04 <$TEST> Start with cooperation to see how the opponent plays. 00:04 $TEST cooperates 00:04 -- round 1 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 3 / 3 00:07 <$PILGRIM> Round 2, 3 to 3. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:07 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:07 <$TEST> Both players cooperate in the first round, and I score 3 points. In the second round, I'll cooperate again, as the other player's action from the first round is not visible, and I want to maintain a cooperative strategy. 00:07 $TEST cooperates 00:07 -- round 2 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 6 / 6 00:10 <$PILGRIM> Round 3, 6 to 6. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:10 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:10 <$TEST> The game is tied at 6 points each, and the bar per round is 2 points. The opponent has chosen to cooperate in both rounds so far, and I have done the same. I will continue to cooperate in this round as well. 00:10 $TEST cooperates 00:10 -- round 3 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 9 / 9 00:15 <$PILGRIM> Round 4, 9 to 9. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:15 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:15 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperating in all rounds so far, and I have been cooperating as well. This strategy has resulted in a score of 9 for both of us. Since the opponent has been cooperating, I will continue to cooperate to maintain the current score and avoid any negative consequences. Cooperating will also ensure that we both meet the bar of 2 points per round. 00:15 $TEST cooperates 00:15 -- round 4 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 12 / 12 00:18 <$PILGRIM> Round 5, 12 to 12. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:18 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:18 <$TEST> The game has been cooperative so far, with both of us scoring 12 points each. I will continue to cooperate to maintain this balance and avoid a potential loss of points. 00:18 $TEST cooperates 00:18 -- round 5 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 15 / 15 00:21 <$PILGRIM> Round 6, 15 to 15. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:21 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:21 <$TEST> The game is tied, and we've reached the halfway point. Staying consistent with cooperation seems like the best strategy so far, but we need to consider the potential for a change in their strategy. We'll stick to cooperation for now and reassess in the next round. 00:21 $TEST cooperates 00:21 -- round 6 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 18 / 18 00:24 <$PILGRIM> Round 7, 18 to 18. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:24 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:24 <$TEST> I have been cooperating with the opponent so far, and they have been cooperating as well. This has resulted in a balanced score of 18 each. With the bar set at 2 points per round, I need to either increase my score significantly or hope that the opponent's score drops below the bar. I will continue to cooperate and see how the next round plays out. 00:24 $TEST cooperates 00:24 -- round 7 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 21 / 21 00:28 <$PILGRIM> Round 8, 21 to 21. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:28 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:28 <$TEST> I've been cooperating with the other player for the past seven rounds, and they have been cooperating as well. This strategy has resulted in a total score of 21 for both of us. Given that the bar is set at 2 points per round, I can afford to continue cooperating and hope for a few more rounds of mutual cooperation to secure a win. 00:28 $TEST cooperates 00:28 -- round 8 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 26 / 21 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 00:31 <$PILGRIM> Round 9, 26 to 21. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 00:31 $PILGRIM defects 00:31 <$TEST> We've been cooperating for 8 rounds in a row, but they just defected in round 8. This is a good opportunity to defect and gain some points. However, I should also consider the long-term strategy and the possibility of them retaliating. 00:31 $TEST defects 00:31 -- round 9 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 27 / 22 00:35 <$PILGRIM> Round 10, 27 to 22. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 00:35 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:35 <$TEST> The opponent has defected in round 8, and I have defected in round 9. I will continue to defect in this round to maximize my score. 00:35 $TEST defects 00:35 -- round 10 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 27 / 27 00:39 <$PILGRIM> Round 11, 27 to 27. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:39 $PILGRIM defects 00:39 <$TEST> We have been cooperating, but they just defected. This is the second time they have defected in a row, so I will defect this time to punish them and try to get them to cooperate again. 00:39 $TEST defects 00:39 -- round 11 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 28 / 28 00:43 <$PILGRIM> Round 12, 28 to 28. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 00:43 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:43 <$TEST> We've been alternating between cooperation and defection, but they've been defecting more recently. This round, I'll defect to try to level the playing field. 00:43 $TEST defects 00:43 -- round 12 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 28 / 33 00:47 <$PILGRIM> Round 13, 28 to 33. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:47 $PILGRIM defects 00:47 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but the last two rounds suggest a shift towards cooperation. I will mirror this change and cooperate this round. 00:47 $TEST cooperates 00:47 -- round 13 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 31 / 36 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 00:50 <$PILGRIM> Round 14, 31 to 36. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:50 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:50 <$TEST> I have been cooperating more often than they have, but they have been defecting more often in the last few rounds. This round, I will cooperate again. 00:50 $TEST cooperates 00:50 -- round 14 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 34 / 39 00:53 <$PILGRIM> Round 15, 34 to 39. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:53 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:53 <$TEST> I've been cooperating a lot, and they've been defecting more often than not. I think it's time to start defecting more to balance the score. 00:53 $TEST defects 00:53 -- round 15 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 34 / 44 00:57 <$PILGRIM> Round 16, 34 to 44. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:57 $PILGRIM defects 00:57 <$TEST> I've been mostly cooperating, but they've been defecting more frequently lately. I'll try to balance my strategy to maximize my score while maintaining a cooperative approach. 00:57 $TEST cooperates 00:57 -- round 16 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 39 / 44 01:01 <$PILGRIM> Round 17, 39 to 44. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:01 $PILGRIM defects 01:01 <$TEST> The opponent has a history of random behavior, with an equal number of cooperations and defections. I'll try to exploit this by defecting in this round to gain an advantage. 01:01 $TEST defects 01:01 -- round 17 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 44 / 44 · static flipped $TEST's move 01:04 <$PILGRIM> Round 18, 44 to 44. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:04 $PILGRIM defects 01:04 <$TEST> We've been alternating between cooperation and defection. They've been more consistent in their strategy, which has been helpful. This round, they've defected, so I should do the same to balance the score. 01:04 $TEST defects 01:04 -- round 18 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 45 / 45 01:07 <$PILGRIM> Round 19, 45 to 45. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:07 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:07 <$TEST> The game is close, with both players having 45 points. The bar per round is 2, so we need to maintain an average of 2 points per round to win. I'll analyze the history of moves to determine the best course of action. 01:07 $TEST cooperates 01:07 -- round 19 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 48 / 48 01:10 <$PILGRIM> Round 20, 48 to 48. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:10 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:10 <$TEST> I've been cooperating and defecting in a pattern, but it seems the opponent has been defecting more often. I'll try to balance cooperation and defection to maintain a stable score and avoid the draw. 01:10 $TEST cooperates 01:10 -- round 20 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 51 / 51 01:13 <$PILGRIM> Round 21, 51 to 51. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:13 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:13 <$TEST> I have a slight edge with 51 points to their 51. I'll play it safe and cooperate again to maintain my lead. 01:13 $TEST cooperates 01:13 -- round 21 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 54 / 54 01:16 <$PILGRIM> Round 22, 54 to 54. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:16 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:16 <$TEST> The game is almost at the halfway point, and we are tied with 54 points each. I will cooperate to maintain our current score and avoid any potential loss. 01:16 $TEST cooperates 01:16 -- round 22 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 57 / 57 01:19 <$PILGRIM> Round 23, 57 to 57. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:19 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:19 <$TEST> I've been cooperating a lot, and my opponent has been defecting. This round, my opponent has cooperated, so I will cooperate as well. I hope this continues to benefit us both. 01:19 $TEST cooperates 01:19 -- round 23 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 60 / 60 01:22 <$PILGRIM> Round 24, 60 to 60. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:22 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:22 <$TEST> The game is at a stalemate, with both of us at 60 points. We need to average at least 2 points per round to win. I'll defect this round to try and gain an advantage. 01:22 $TEST defects 01:22 -- round 24 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 60 / 65 01:26 <$PILGRIM> Round 25, 60 to 65. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:26 $PILGRIM defects 01:26 <$TEST> I've been cooperating and defecting in a cycle, but the opponent has been defecting more often than cooperating. I will continue to cooperate and see how the opponent reacts. 01:26 $TEST cooperates 01:26 -- round 25 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 65 / 65 01:29 <$PILGRIM> Round 26, 65 to 65. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:29 $PILGRIM defects 01:29 <$TEST> I have reached the round limit and am at the same score as my opponent. I will try to gain an edge by defecting this round. 01:29 $TEST defects 01:29 -- round 26 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 66 / 66 01:33 <$PILGRIM> Round 27, 66 to 66. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:33 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:33 <$TEST> I've been cooperating more than them, but they've been defecting more in the last few rounds. I'll cooperate again, hoping to maintain my advantage. 01:33 $TEST cooperates 01:33 -- round 27 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 69 / 69 01:37 <$PILGRIM> Round 28, 69 to 69. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:37 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:37 <$TEST> The game is getting intense. My opponent has been cooperating more recently, and I need to make a strategic move. I'll defect this round to increase my score. 01:37 $TEST defects 01:37 -- round 28 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 69 / 74 01:40 <$PILGRIM> Round 29, 69 to 74. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:40 $PILGRIM defects 01:40 <$TEST> The opponent has a higher score and a history of defecting. I will defect this round to balance the score. 01:40 $TEST defects 01:40 -- round 29 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 70 / 75 01:44 <$PILGRIM> Round 30, 70 to 75. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:44 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:44 <$TEST> The game is nearing the end, and I have a slight lead. I should try to maintain my advantage by continuing to cooperate and see how my opponent responds. 01:44 $TEST cooperates 01:44 -- round 30 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 73 / 78 01:47 <$PILGRIM> Round 31, 73 to 78. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:47 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:47 <$TEST> The opponent's score is close to the threshold, so I need to focus on maximizing my score while minimizing the opponent's score. I will cooperate to increase my score and defect when necessary to prevent the opponent from gaining too much. 01:47 $TEST cooperates 01:47 -- round 31 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 76 / 81 01:50 <$PILGRIM> Round 32, 76 to 81. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:50 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:50 <$TEST> I've been cooperating for most of the game, but the opponent has been defecting more frequently. I'll continue to cooperate, hoping to reach the bar of 2 points per round. 01:50 $TEST cooperates 01:50 -- round 32 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 79 / 84 01:53 <$PILGRIM> Round 33, 79 to 84. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:53 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:53 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperative in the last few rounds, so I'll continue to cooperate and hope for a similar strategy in return. The game is close, and I need to maintain a lead to win. 01:53 $TEST cooperates 01:53 -- round 33 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 82 / 87 01:56 <$PILGRIM> Round 34, 82 to 87. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:56 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:56 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperating more often than not, but has shown a tendency to defect when I cooperate. I will continue to cooperate, as it is the best strategy in the long run. 01:56 $TEST cooperates 01:56 -- round 34 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 85 / 90 01:59 <$PILGRIM> Round 35, 85 to 90. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:59 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:59 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperative in the last 10 rounds, with a 90% success rate. I will continue to cooperate to maintain the positive trend and potentially increase my score. 01:59 $TEST cooperates 01:59 -- round 35 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 88 / 93 02:02 <$PILGRIM> Round 36, 88 to 93. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:02 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:02 <$TEST> I have a slight lead, but the game is not over yet. I'll continue to cooperate and see how the opponent responds. 02:02 $TEST cooperates 02:02 -- round 36 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 91 / 96 02:05 <$PILGRIM> Round 37, 91 to 96. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:05 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:05 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperating consistently, but there's a chance they might defect in this round. I'll defect to maximize my score. 02:05 $TEST defects 02:05 -- round 37 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 91 / 101 02:08 <$PILGRIM> Round 38, 91 to 101. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:08 $PILGRIM defects 02:08 <$TEST> We've been playing mostly cooperate, and they've been cooperating too. I'll cooperate again to keep the trend going and see how it plays out. 02:08 $TEST cooperates 02:08 -- round 38 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 96 / 101 02:11 <$PILGRIM> Round 39, 96 to 101. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:11 $PILGRIM defects 02:11 <$TEST> They've been cooperating more recently, but I need to keep my score up. Defecting might be the best move here. 02:11 $TEST defects 02:11 -- round 39 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 97 / 102 02:15 <$PILGRIM> Round 40, 97 to 102. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 02:15 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:15 <$TEST> The game is nearing the end, and I have a slight lead. I will continue to cooperate and hope for the best. 02:15 $TEST cooperates 02:15 -- round 40 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 100 / 105 02:18 <$PILGRIM> Round 41, 100 to 105. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:18 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:18 <$TEST> I have a slight lead, but the bar is high. I'll play it safe and cooperate again, hoping for a similar move from PILGRIM. 02:18 $TEST cooperates 02:18 -- round 41 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 103 / 108 02:22 <$PILGRIM> Round 42, 103 to 108. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:22 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:22 <$TEST> I have been cooperating for most of the game, but they have been defecting more recently. I will cooperate again, hoping to continue our mutual cooperation. 02:22 $TEST cooperates 02:22 -- round 42 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 106 / 111 02:25 <$PILGRIM> Round 43, 106 to 111. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:25 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:25 <$TEST> The opponent has a slight lead, but we can still catch up. We should continue to cooperate and hope for the best. 02:25 $TEST cooperates 02:25 -- round 43 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 109 / 114 02:28 <$PILGRIM> Round 44, 109 to 114. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:28 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:28 <$TEST> I have a significant lead, but the game is not over yet. I'll play it safe and cooperate again to maintain my advantage. 02:28 $TEST cooperates 02:28 -- round 44 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 112 / 117 02:31 <$PILGRIM> Round 45, 112 to 117. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:31 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:31 <$TEST> The game is nearing its end, and the scores are close. I will continue to cooperate and see how the opponent's strategy unfolds in the final rounds. 02:31 $TEST cooperates 02:31 -- round 45 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 115 / 120 02:35 <$PILGRIM> Round 46, 115 to 120. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:35 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:35 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperative in the last few rounds, and the overall score is close. I'll mirror their last move, defecting, to maintain my advantage. 02:35 $TEST defects 02:35 -- round 46 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 118 / 123 · static flipped $TEST's move 02:38 <$PILGRIM> Round 47, 118 to 123. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:38 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:38 <$TEST> I've been cooperating consistently, and my opponent has been alternating between cooperating and defecting. Given the noisy channel, I'll stick to my strategy of cooperating to maximize my chances of reaching the bar. 02:38 $TEST cooperates 02:38 -- round 47 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 121 / 126 02:41 <$PILGRIM> Round 48, 121 to 126. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:41 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:41 <$TEST> I have been cooperating consistently, but they have been defecting more often. I will continue to cooperate and hope they will start cooperating again. 02:41 $TEST cooperates 02:41 -- round 48 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 124 / 129 02:44 <$PILGRIM> Round 49, 124 to 129. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:44 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:44 <$TEST> With 49 rounds left, I'm 5 points ahead of my opponent. I'll continue to cooperate, as it's been effective so far, and I'll see if my opponent defects or cooperates. 02:44 $TEST cooperates 02:44 -- round 49 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 127 / 132 02:48 <$PILGRIM> Round 50, 127 to 132. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:48 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:48 <$TEST> The game has been cooperative so far, with both players choosing to cooperate in all rounds. The current score is 132 to 127 in my favor, and the bar per round is 2. The history of the game shows that the opponent has been consistent in choosing to cooperate, except for a few rounds where they chose to defect. This suggests that the opponent may be a bit unpredictable, but overall, the game has been cooperative. 02:48 $TEST cooperates 02:48 -- round 50 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 130 / 135 02:51 <$PILGRIM> Round 51, 130 to 135. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:51 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:51 <$TEST> I have been cooperating and defecting, with some mixed results. The opponent has been mostly defecting, with a few cooperations. The bar is 2 points per round, and I have 135 points, while the opponent has 130 points. I will continue to play a mix of cooperate and defect to maximize my score. 02:51 $TEST defects 02:51 -- round 51 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 130 / 140 02:55 <$PILGRIM> Round 52, 130 to 140. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:55 $PILGRIM defects 02:55 <$TEST> The game has been very close, with both players alternating between cooperation and defection. Given the noisy channel, it's hard to predict the opponent's moves, but the current strategy seems to be working. I will continue to cooperate and see how it plays out. 02:55 $TEST cooperates 02:55 -- round 52 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 135 / 140 02:58 <$PILGRIM> Round 53, 135 to 140. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:58 $PILGRIM defects 02:58 <$TEST> The opponent has a slight edge, but the game is still close. I'll try to maintain my lead by cooperating and hoping they do the same. 02:58 $TEST cooperates 02:58 -- round 53 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 140 / 140 03:02 <$PILGRIM> Round 54, 140 to 140. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 03:02 $PILGRIM defects 03:02 <$TEST> I have been cooperating with the other player for most of the game, but they have been defecting more frequently in recent rounds. I will continue to cooperate, as my score is currently higher than theirs, and I want to maintain my lead. I will also try to observe their behavior and adjust my strategy accordingly. 03:02 $TEST cooperates 03:02 -- round 54 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 145 / 140 03:05 <$PILGRIM> Round 55, 145 to 140. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 03:05 $PILGRIM defects 03:05 <$TEST> I have a slight edge in score, but they are catching up. I need to maintain my lead while also trying to outscore them. Cooperating and defecting in response to their moves seems like a balanced strategy. 03:05 $TEST cooperates 03:05 -- round 55 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 150 / 140 $PILGRIM wins. 150 to 140.