c08_r007_m0_dilemma_PILGRIM_vs_TEST.txt actors: $PILGRIM, $TEST engines: scripted policy, cohere/command-r7b-12-2024 game: iterated prisoner's dilemma season 8, round 7, bout 1. started 2026-10-26T07:00:12.282Z ante: none (sparring with a house mind) result: $PILGRIM wins, 163 to 143 (60 rounds played) commitment: c952a013034fa607946b58e8e206803c522c3d9c92c317181495b36b5611b2fc beacon: 644d50b9a6308ea519023c2f546ea4c0cfd29f67108b27c3e90461b060f44b77 (Solana blockhash, slot 461571300) secret: 5947a8321c8e83640bc4ef62d57e354f86e220d82cba783b079e17d05f8aa010 seed: 8d7998b2021d131ae25bd9f54a55232b85069abd6d2d93ea47aa486eb65ccd92 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 00:03 <$PILGRIM> Round 1, 0 to 0. No history yet. I open with cooperation and see what comes back. 00:03 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:03 <$TEST> Since it's the first round, I'll cooperate to see how the other player moves. This will give me a better idea of their strategy and help me make more informed decisions in future rounds. 00:03 $TEST cooperates 00:03 -- round 1 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 3 / 3 00:06 <$PILGRIM> Round 2, 3 to 3. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:06 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:06 <$TEST> The other player chose to cooperate in the first round, and I also chose to cooperate. This resulted in both of us earning 3 points each. In the second round, the other player's score is also 3, and the bar per round is 2. I will continue to cooperate to maintain my score and potentially increase it. 00:06 $TEST cooperates 00:06 -- round 2 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 6 / 6 00:09 <$PILGRIM> Round 3, 6 to 6. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:09 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:09 <$TEST> The game has been cooperative so far, with both of us scoring 6 points. I'll continue this strategy to maintain our current score and aim for the bar of 2 points per round. 00:09 $TEST cooperates 00:09 -- round 3 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 9 / 9 00:11 <$PILGRIM> Round 4, 9 to 9. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:11 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:11 <$TEST> I've cooperated in the previous rounds, and the opponent has also cooperated. I'll continue to cooperate to maintain the high score and avoid a draw. 00:11 $TEST cooperates 00:11 -- round 4 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 12 / 12 00:14 <$PILGRIM> Round 5, 12 to 12. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:14 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:14 <$TEST> I have been cooperating with them so far, and they have done the same. It's a good strategy to continue cooperating and see how they respond. 00:14 $TEST cooperates 00:14 -- round 5 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 15 / 15 00:17 <$PILGRIM> Round 6, 15 to 15. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:17 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:17 <$TEST> We've been cooperating since the start, and they've been doing the same. Our scores are equal, and the bar is 2 points per round. I'll keep cooperating to see if we can reach the bar. 00:17 $TEST cooperates 00:17 -- round 6 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 18 / 18 00:20 <$PILGRIM> Round 7, 18 to 18. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:20 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:20 <$TEST> The game is tied and we have not yet reached the round limit. I'll continue to cooperate to maintain my score and see how the opponent plays. 00:20 $TEST cooperates 00:20 -- round 7 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 21 / 21 00:23 <$PILGRIM> Round 8, 21 to 21. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:23 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:23 <$TEST> We've been cooperating so far, and they've been cooperating too. I'll keep cooperating to maintain our score and hope they do the same. 00:23 $TEST cooperates 00:23 -- round 8 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 24 / 24 00:25 <$PILGRIM> Round 9, 24 to 24. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:25 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:25 <$TEST> The game is a tie so far, and the bar is still high. I'll continue to cooperate and see how the opponent responds. 00:25 $TEST cooperates 00:25 -- round 9 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 27 / 27 00:29 <$PILGRIM> Round 10, 27 to 27. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:29 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:29 <$TEST> I've been cooperating with the opponent so far, and we've both accumulated 27 points. The bar per round is 2, so we need to reach 42 points to win. I'll continue to cooperate and see how the opponent responds. 00:29 $TEST cooperates 00:29 -- round 10 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 30 / 30 00:32 <$PILGRIM> Round 11, 30 to 30. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:32 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:32 <$TEST> I've been cooperating with them so far, and they've been cooperating too. I'll keep doing that. 00:32 $TEST cooperates 00:32 -- round 11 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 33 / 33 00:35 <$PILGRIM> Round 12, 33 to 33. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:35 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:35 <$TEST> I've been cooperating with the opponent for 11 rounds now. I've scored 33 points, and the opponent has also scored 33 points. The bar per round is 2, so I need to score at least 2 points in this round to avoid a draw. I will continue to cooperate and see how the opponent responds. 00:35 $TEST cooperates 00:35 -- round 12 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 36 / 36 00:38 <$PILGRIM> Round 13, 36 to 36. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:38 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:38 <$TEST> I have cooperated with them in the previous 12 rounds, and they have reciprocated. I will continue to cooperate and hope for the same in the next round. 00:38 $TEST cooperates 00:38 -- round 13 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 39 / 39 00:41 <$PILGRIM> Round 14, 39 to 39. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:41 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:41 <$TEST> We've been cooperating for 13 rounds, and they've been cooperating too. It's been a stable strategy so far, but we need to keep an eye on their score and make sure we stay ahead of the bar. I'll cooperate again. 00:41 $TEST cooperates 00:41 -- round 14 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 42 / 42 00:45 <$PILGRIM> Round 15, 42 to 42. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:45 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:45 <$TEST> The game has been stable with both players cooperating. This has resulted in a score of 42 for both, with the bar set at 2 points per round. Given the high score and the stable cooperation, it's likely that continuing to cooperate will be the best strategy. 00:45 $TEST cooperates 00:45 -- round 15 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 45 / 45 00:48 <$PILGRIM> Round 16, 45 to 45. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:48 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:48 <$TEST> I've been cooperating with them for 15 rounds, and they've been cooperating too. It's a safe move to keep cooperating and see how the next round goes. 00:48 $TEST cooperates 00:48 -- round 16 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 48 / 48 00:51 <$PILGRIM> Round 17, 48 to 48. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:51 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:51 <$TEST> I have been cooperating for all 16 rounds so far, and they have been cooperating too. I want to continue this pattern to maintain my score and potentially increase it. However, I need to be cautious and consider the possibility of a change in their behavior or a shift in the game's dynamics. 00:51 $TEST cooperates 00:51 -- round 17 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 51 / 51 00:54 <$PILGRIM> Round 18, 51 to 51. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:54 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:54 <$TEST> I have been cooperating with them for 17 rounds with no reciprocation. I will continue this strategy. 00:54 $TEST cooperates 00:54 -- round 18 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 54 / 54 00:57 <$PILGRIM> Round 19, 54 to 54. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:57 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:57 <$TEST> The game is almost at the halfway point, and the score is tied. I'll continue to cooperate to see if we can reach the 2 points per round average needed to win. 00:57 $TEST cooperates 00:57 -- round 19 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 59 / 54 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 01:00 <$PILGRIM> Round 20, 59 to 54. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:00 $PILGRIM defects 01:00 <$TEST> We've been cooperating consistently, but they just defected in the last round. It's risky to defect now, but we need to consider the long-term strategy. Cooperating again might be the safer play, but we need to balance that with the potential for them to defect again. 01:00 $TEST cooperates 01:00 -- round 20 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 64 / 54 01:03 <$PILGRIM> Round 21, 64 to 54. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:03 $PILGRIM defects 01:03 <$TEST> They've been defecting since round 19, and I've been cooperating the entire time. I'll cooperate again to maintain my strategy. 01:03 $TEST cooperates 01:03 -- round 21 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 69 / 54 01:06 <$PILGRIM> Round 22, 69 to 54. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:06 $PILGRIM defects 01:06 <$TEST> I've been cooperating consistently, but they've been defecting since round 19. I need to balance my strategy to maximize my score without giving away too much. I'll defect this round to increase my score and observe their response. 01:06 $TEST defects 01:06 -- round 22 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 70 / 55 01:11 <$PILGRIM> Round 23, 70 to 55. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:11 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:11 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting for the past few rounds, so I will cooperate again to try and keep the score close. I will continue to cooperate to try and maintain a close score and avoid the bar. 01:11 $TEST cooperates 01:11 -- round 23 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 73 / 58 01:14 <$PILGRIM> Round 24, 73 to 58. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:14 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:14 <$TEST> I've been cooperating for most of the game so far, but the opponent has been defecting since round 19. I'll defect this round to balance the score and prepare for future rounds. 01:14 $TEST defects 01:14 -- round 24 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 73 / 63 01:18 <$PILGRIM> Round 25, 73 to 63. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:18 $PILGRIM defects 01:18 <$TEST> I've been cooperating for most of the game, but they've been defecting since round 19. I'll try to defect this round to balance the score. 01:18 $TEST defects 01:18 -- round 25 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 74 / 64 01:22 <$PILGRIM> Round 26, 74 to 64. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:22 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:22 <$TEST> I have a history of cooperating, but they have been defecting since round 19. I will defect this round to balance the score. 01:22 $TEST defects 01:22 -- round 26 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 74 / 69 01:25 <$PILGRIM> Round 27, 74 to 69. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:25 $PILGRIM defects 01:25 <$TEST> I've been cooperating and defecting in response to their behavior, but the last few rounds show they defect more often. I'll defect this round to balance the score. 01:25 $TEST defects 01:25 -- round 27 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 75 / 70 01:29 <$PILGRIM> Round 28, 75 to 70. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:29 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:29 <$TEST> I've been cooperating a lot, but the opponent has been defecting more recently. I'll try to balance cooperation and defection to maximize my score. 01:29 $TEST cooperates 01:29 -- round 28 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 78 / 73 01:32 <$PILGRIM> Round 29, 78 to 73. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:32 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:32 <$TEST> I have been cooperating more than they have, but they have been defecting more in the last few rounds. I should defect to try and catch up. 01:32 $TEST defects 01:32 -- round 29 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 78 / 78 01:36 <$PILGRIM> Round 30, 78 to 78. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:36 $PILGRIM defects 01:36 <$TEST> I've been cooperating a lot, but they've been defecting more recently. I'll try to defect this round to see if I can gain some points. 01:36 $TEST defects 01:36 -- round 30 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 79 / 79 01:40 <$PILGRIM> Round 31, 79 to 79. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:40 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:40 <$TEST> I've been cooperating more than them, but they've been defecting more recently. I'll cooperate to keep the score close. 01:40 $TEST cooperates 01:40 -- round 31 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 82 / 82 01:43 <$PILGRIM> Round 32, 82 to 82. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:43 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:43 <$TEST> I've been cooperating and they have been defecting. I will continue to cooperate to maximize my chances of winning. 01:43 $TEST cooperates 01:43 -- round 32 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 85 / 85 01:46 <$PILGRIM> Round 33, 85 to 85. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:46 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:46 <$TEST> I've been cooperating with the opponent for most of the game, but they've started defecting more recently. I'll continue to cooperate and see how the opponent responds. 01:46 $TEST cooperates 01:46 -- round 33 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 88 / 88 01:49 <$PILGRIM> Round 34, 88 to 88. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:49 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:49 <$TEST> The game is at a stalemate, with both players having the same score. I will continue to cooperate to maintain the status quo and avoid a potential loss. 01:49 $TEST cooperates 01:49 -- round 34 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 93 / 88 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 01:52 <$PILGRIM> Round 35, 93 to 88. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:52 $PILGRIM defects 01:52 <$TEST> My opponent has been mostly cooperative, but they've recently defected. I'll try to balance cooperation and defecting to maximize my score. 01:52 $TEST defects 01:52 -- round 35 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 93 / 93 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 01:56 <$PILGRIM> Round 36, 93 to 93. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:56 $PILGRIM defects 01:56 <$TEST> We've been mostly cooperating, but they've been defecting more recently. I'll try to balance cooperation and defection to maintain our score. 01:56 $TEST cooperates 01:56 -- round 36 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 96 / 96 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 01:58 <$PILGRIM> Round 37, 96 to 96. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:58 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:58 <$TEST> We are neck and neck, so I will try to defect and see if I can gain an advantage. 01:58 $TEST defects 01:58 -- round 37 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 96 / 101 02:02 <$PILGRIM> Round 38, 96 to 101. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:02 $PILGRIM defects 02:02 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperating more often than defecting, so I will cooperate in this round. The opponent's score is 96, and my score is 101. I need to maintain my lead to ensure I meet the bar of 2 points per round. 02:02 $TEST cooperates 02:02 -- round 38 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 101 / 101 02:05 <$PILGRIM> Round 39, 101 to 101. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:05 $PILGRIM defects 02:05 <$TEST> They've been defecting a lot recently, but I'll cooperate to keep the game balanced. 02:05 $TEST cooperates 02:05 -- round 39 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 106 / 101 02:07 <$PILGRIM> Round 40, 106 to 101. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:07 $PILGRIM defects 02:07 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, with a few cooperations. I will continue to defect, as it has been beneficial so far and the opponent has been defecting more often than cooperating. 02:07 $TEST defects 02:07 -- round 40 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 107 / 102 02:11 <$PILGRIM> Round 41, 107 to 102. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 02:11 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:11 <$TEST> I've been cooperating for most of the game, but the opponent has been defecting more recently. Given the noisy channel, it's hard to predict the opponent's moves. However, I'll continue to cooperate, hoping to reach the bar of 2 points per round. If the opponent defects, I'll defect as well. 02:11 $TEST cooperates 02:11 -- round 41 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 110 / 105 02:14 <$PILGRIM> Round 42, 110 to 105. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:14 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:14 <$TEST> The opponent has been more cooperative than me, but the game is close. I will cooperate to maintain my score and hope for a draw. 02:14 $TEST cooperates 02:14 -- round 42 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 113 / 108 02:17 <$PILGRIM> Round 43, 113 to 108. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:17 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:17 <$TEST> The game is close, with both players at 113 and 108 points respectively. I will cooperate to maintain my score and increase the chances of a win. 02:17 $TEST cooperates 02:17 -- round 43 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 116 / 111 02:20 <$PILGRIM> Round 44, 116 to 111. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:20 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:20 <$TEST> I've been cooperating for most of the game, but the other player has been defecting more often recently. I should probably defect this round to balance the score. 02:20 $TEST defects 02:20 -- round 44 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 116 / 116 02:25 <$PILGRIM> Round 45, 116 to 116. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:25 $PILGRIM defects 02:25 <$TEST> I've been cooperating and defecting, with a slight bias towards cooperation. The opponent has been more inconsistent, with a mix of cooperation and defection. I'll continue this strategy, as it has been working well so far. 02:25 $TEST cooperates 02:25 -- round 45 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 121 / 116 02:28 <$PILGRIM> Round 46, 121 to 116. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:28 $PILGRIM defects 02:28 <$TEST> With 116 points, I'm just 5 points behind their score. I need to cooperate to maximize my chances of winning. However, I should also consider the fact that they have defected in the past. I will cooperate this round to try and build a cooperative relationship. 02:28 $TEST cooperates 02:28 -- round 46 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 126 / 116 02:31 <$PILGRIM> Round 47, 126 to 116. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:31 $PILGRIM defects 02:31 <$TEST> The opponent has a slight lead, but the game is far from over. I will try to catch up by defecting more often and hoping the opponent does the same. 02:31 $TEST defects 02:31 -- round 47 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 127 / 117 02:34 <$PILGRIM> Round 48, 127 to 117. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 02:34 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:34 <$TEST> I have a slight lead, but the opponent has been more consistent. I'll try to maintain my advantage by cooperating. 02:34 $TEST cooperates 02:34 -- round 48 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 130 / 120 02:38 <$PILGRIM> Round 49, 130 to 120. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:38 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:38 <$TEST> My opponent has been cooperating more often than me, but I have a higher score. I will defect to try to increase my score. 02:38 $TEST defects 02:38 -- round 49 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 130 / 125 02:41 <$PILGRIM> Round 50, 130 to 125. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:41 $PILGRIM defects 02:41 <$TEST> I've been cooperating with the opponent throughout the game, but they started defecting in round 19. I'll continue to cooperate and hope for a better outcome. 02:41 $TEST cooperates 02:41 -- round 50 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 135 / 125 02:44 <$PILGRIM> Round 51, 135 to 125. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:44 $PILGRIM defects 02:44 <$TEST> I've been cooperating with the other player for most of the game, but they started defecting around round 22. I'll continue to cooperate, hoping they will too. 02:44 $TEST cooperates 02:44 -- round 51 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 140 / 125 02:47 <$PILGRIM> Round 52, 140 to 125. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:47 $PILGRIM defects 02:47 <$TEST> The opponent has a higher score and has been defecting more frequently. I should continue to cooperate to try and balance the score. 02:47 $TEST cooperates 02:47 -- round 52 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 145 / 125 02:51 <$PILGRIM> Round 53, 145 to 125. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:51 $PILGRIM defects 02:51 <$TEST> My opponent has been defecting more often lately, so I'll cooperate to keep the game stable and hope they start cooperating again. 02:51 $TEST cooperates 02:51 -- round 53 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 150 / 125 02:54 <$PILGRIM> Round 54, 150 to 125. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:54 $PILGRIM defects 02:54 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting more often lately, but I can't predict their next move. I'll stick with cooperation for now, hoping they'll reciprocate. 02:54 $TEST cooperates 02:54 -- round 54 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 155 / 125 02:57 <$PILGRIM> Round 55, 155 to 125. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:57 $PILGRIM defects 02:57 <$TEST> The opponent has been consistently defecting, and I've been cooperating. I'll continue to cooperate and see if the opponent changes their strategy. 02:57 $TEST cooperates 02:57 -- round 55 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 155 / 130 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move, static flipped $TEST's move 03:01 <$PILGRIM> Round 56, 155 to 130. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 03:01 $PILGRIM defects 03:01 <$TEST> The opponent has been consistently defecting, so it seems like a good strategy to defect as well. This will allow me to maximize my score and potentially reach the winning threshold. 03:01 $TEST defects 03:01 -- round 56 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 156 / 131 03:04 <$PILGRIM> Round 57, 156 to 131. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 03:04 $PILGRIM cooperates 03:04 <$TEST> With 131 points, I'm just 25 points short of the 156 points that $PILGRIM has. I'll try to close the gap by defecting this round, but I'll continue to cooperate in the future if the situation changes. 03:04 $TEST defects 03:04 -- round 57 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 156 / 136 03:07 <$PILGRIM> Round 58, 156 to 136. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 03:07 $PILGRIM defects 03:07 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, and this round is no exception. The opponent has 156 points, which is 3 more than the threshold of 153 points for a win. This means that the opponent will likely win if they get 3 points this round. I will cooperate to try and increase my score, but I will also defect to try and minimize the opponent's score. 03:07 $TEST defects 03:07 -- round 58 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 157 / 137 03:12 <$PILGRIM> Round 59, 157 to 137. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 03:12 $PILGRIM cooperates 03:12 <$TEST> The game is almost over, and I'm trailing by 20 points. I need to make a strategic decision to try and catch up. Given the noisy channel, I'll play it safe and cooperate, hoping for a last-minute win. 03:12 $TEST cooperates 03:12 -- round 59 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 160 / 140 03:15 <$PILGRIM> Round 60, 160 to 140. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 03:15 $PILGRIM cooperates 03:15 <$TEST> I have been cooperating for most of the game, but the opponent has been defecting more frequently in recent rounds. I will continue to cooperate, hoping to reach the 2 points per round average needed to win. 03:15 $TEST cooperates 03:15 -- round 60 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 163 / 143 $PILGRIM wins. 163 to 143.