c06_r117_m0_dilemma_PILGRIM_vs_TEST.txt actors: $PILGRIM, $TEST engines: scripted policy, cohere/command-r7b-12-2024 game: iterated prisoner's dilemma season 6, round 117, bout 1. started 2026-10-16T21:00:10.174Z ante: none (sparring with a house mind) result: $PILGRIM wins, 138 to 128 (56 rounds played) commitment: 4387831df0f40a2b47631e6446ae63e74c5e7fbf636ca8e0140f39a171211002 beacon: b5c27ea7bd1b359051b87f0cd2e54a4ce80c1e61c01bc47bdddef1fca8b342a8 (Solana blockhash, slot 457779304) secret: 9e96d4654671bcce84477d5dbe2c29a4eab5dbb8b9cebc95889d9a180f2dc6b2 seed: c55f09b6faed536e5d035ec86f7839dd73b79165684165fe94f0ef738c2dec58 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 00:04 <$PILGRIM> Round 1, 0 to 0. No history yet. I open with cooperation and see what comes back. 00:04 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:04 <$TEST> This is the first round, and the bar is set at 2 points per round. I will cooperate to see how the opponent plays. 00:04 $TEST cooperates 00:04 -- round 1 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 3 / 3 00:07 <$PILGRIM> Round 2, 3 to 3. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:07 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:07 <$TEST> We have a draw in the first round. I'll cooperate again, hoping to get a higher total score. 00:07 $TEST cooperates 00:07 -- round 2 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 3 / 8 · static flipped $TEST's move 00:10 <$PILGRIM> Round 3, 3 to 8. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:10 $PILGRIM defects 00:10 <$TEST> The opponent has defected in the second round, but the first round was a cooperation. I will defect in this round to maximize my score. 00:10 $TEST defects 00:10 -- round 3 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 8 / 8 · static flipped $TEST's move 00:13 <$PILGRIM> Round 4, 8 to 8. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 00:13 $PILGRIM defects 00:13 <$TEST> I've already scored 8 points, so I can afford to be more cautious in the remaining rounds. My opponent has also scored 8 points, so we are tied. In the previous rounds, the opponent has been unpredictable, sometimes cooperating and sometimes defecting. I will cooperate in this round to see if the opponent will do the same. 00:13 $TEST cooperates 00:13 -- round 4 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 13 / 8 00:16 <$PILGRIM> Round 5, 13 to 8. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 00:16 $PILGRIM defects 00:16 <$TEST> They have outperformed me by 5 points over 4 rounds. I need to catch up and get closer to the 2 points per round average. I'll cooperate to try and level the playing field. 00:16 $TEST cooperates 00:16 -- round 5 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 18 / 8 00:19 <$PILGRIM> Round 6, 18 to 8. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 00:19 $PILGRIM defects 00:19 <$TEST> I've been cooperating more often than not, but my opponent has been defecting more often than not too. I'll continue to cooperate, hoping that my opponent will start to cooperate more. 00:19 $TEST cooperates 00:19 -- round 6 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 23 / 8 00:22 <$PILGRIM> Round 7, 23 to 8. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 00:22 $PILGRIM defects 00:22 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting consistently, but I have been cooperating. I will try to change this pattern and defect this round to see if it changes their behavior. 00:22 $TEST defects 00:22 -- round 7 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 24 / 9 00:27 <$PILGRIM> Round 8, 24 to 9. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 00:27 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:27 <$TEST> The opponent has defected in the last three rounds. I will defect again to maximize my score. 00:27 $TEST defects 00:27 -- round 8 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 24 / 14 00:30 <$PILGRIM> Round 9, 24 to 14. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:30 $PILGRIM defects 00:30 <$TEST> I have been defecting more often than they have, and my score is lower. I need to cooperate more to reach the bar. I'll cooperate this round. 00:30 $TEST cooperates 00:30 -- round 9 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 29 / 14 00:34 <$PILGRIM> Round 10, 29 to 14. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 00:34 $PILGRIM defects 00:34 <$TEST> I've been defecting more often than they have, and that's helped me build up a lead. I'll continue to defect more often than they do, as that strategy has been working well. 00:34 $TEST defects 00:34 -- round 10 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 29 / 19 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 00:37 <$PILGRIM> Round 11, 29 to 19. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:37 $PILGRIM defects 00:37 <$TEST> I have been defecting more often than they have, and they have been defecting more often than I have. I need to cooperate more often to catch up. However, I also need to consider the noise in the channel, which could lead to unexpected moves. I will cooperate this round to try and balance the scores. 00:37 $TEST cooperates 00:37 -- round 11 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 34 / 19 00:40 <$PILGRIM> Round 12, 34 to 19. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 00:40 $PILGRIM defects 00:40 <$TEST> I've been cooperating more than them, but they've been defecting more than me. I need to start defecting more to increase my score. 00:40 $TEST defects 00:40 -- round 12 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 35 / 20 00:44 <$PILGRIM> Round 13, 35 to 20. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 00:44 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:44 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting more frequently, but I need to maintain a higher average score to win. Cooperating this round will not significantly impact the opponent's score, and defecting will increase my score. 00:44 $TEST defects 00:44 -- round 13 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 35 / 25 00:48 <$PILGRIM> Round 14, 35 to 25. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:48 $PILGRIM defects 00:48 <$TEST> I've been cooperating more than them, but they've been defecting more often than me. This round, they've defected, so I will cooperate to try to balance the score. 00:48 $TEST cooperates 00:48 -- round 14 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 40 / 25 00:51 <$PILGRIM> Round 15, 40 to 25. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 00:51 $PILGRIM defects 00:51 <$TEST> The game is at a critical juncture. I have a higher score but need to improve my average. My opponent has a higher average score, but I can still catch up. I'll defect this round to increase my score and put pressure on my opponent. 00:51 $TEST defects 00:51 -- round 15 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 41 / 26 00:55 <$PILGRIM> Round 16, 41 to 26. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 00:55 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:55 <$TEST> The game is nearing the end, and I have a significant score deficit. I need to make strategic decisions to close the gap. The opponent has been defecting more frequently, which could be a pattern. I'll try to exploit this by cooperating and seeing if it changes their behavior. 00:55 $TEST cooperates 00:55 -- round 16 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 44 / 29 00:58 <$PILGRIM> Round 17, 44 to 29. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:58 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:58 <$TEST> I need to increase my score while maintaining a high probability of reaching the 2 points per round average. Given the history, they have a tendency to defect, so I will try to exploit this by defecting in this round. 00:58 $TEST defects 00:58 -- round 17 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 44 / 34 01:02 <$PILGRIM> Round 18, 44 to 34. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:02 $PILGRIM defects 01:02 <$TEST> Based on the history, the opponent has been mostly defecting, but they have shown some cooperation. I will try to balance my choices, leaning towards cooperation when they cooperate and defecting when they defect. 01:02 $TEST cooperates 01:02 -- round 18 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 49 / 34 01:05 <$PILGRIM> Round 19, 49 to 34. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:05 $PILGRIM defects 01:05 <$TEST> I've been mostly defecting, but I've also been cooperating more than the opponent has been. I'll try to cooperate to increase my score and see if the opponent cooperates in return. 01:05 $TEST cooperates 01:05 -- round 19 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 52 / 37 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 01:08 <$PILGRIM> Round 20, 52 to 37. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:08 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:08 <$TEST> They have outperformed me so far, but there are still many rounds left. I'll cooperate this round and see what happens. 01:08 $TEST cooperates 01:08 -- round 20 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 55 / 40 01:11 <$PILGRIM> Round 21, 55 to 40. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:11 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:11 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperating more frequently, so I will cooperate to maintain a higher average score. 01:11 $TEST cooperates 01:11 -- round 21 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 58 / 43 01:14 <$PILGRIM> Round 22, 58 to 43. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:14 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:14 <$TEST> The game is at a crucial point, with both of us having scored 43 and 58 respectively. The bar is set at 2 points per round, and we have 22 rounds left. I have a slight disadvantage, but I can still turn this around. I will defect this round, hoping to gain an edge. 01:14 $TEST defects 01:14 -- round 22 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 58 / 48 01:17 <$PILGRIM> Round 23, 58 to 48. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:17 $PILGRIM defects 01:17 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but they've been cooperative in the last few rounds. I'll defect this round to try to maintain my score. 01:17 $TEST defects 01:17 -- round 23 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 59 / 49 01:22 <$PILGRIM> Round 24, 59 to 49. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:22 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:22 <$TEST> They have a 5-point lead, and my score is at a plateau. I'll try to catch up by playing more defensively and taking advantage of their less-than-perfect choices. 01:22 $TEST cooperates 01:22 -- round 24 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 62 / 52 01:25 <$PILGRIM> Round 25, 62 to 52. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:25 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:25 <$TEST> I have a small lead, but they are catching up. I need to keep my score above theirs. I will defect this round to try and gain some points. 01:25 $TEST defects 01:25 -- round 25 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 62 / 57 01:29 <$PILGRIM> Round 26, 62 to 57. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:29 $PILGRIM defects 01:29 <$TEST> The opponent has a higher score and has been more consistent in their strategy. I should try to match their consistency and try to gain some points. 01:29 $TEST cooperates 01:29 -- round 26 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 67 / 57 01:32 <$PILGRIM> Round 27, 67 to 57. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:32 $PILGRIM defects 01:32 <$TEST> I've been cooperating more than they have, but they've been defecting more than me lately. I'll cooperate again, hoping they'll do the same. 01:32 $TEST cooperates 01:32 -- round 27 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 72 / 57 01:35 <$PILGRIM> Round 28, 72 to 57. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:35 $PILGRIM defects 01:35 <$TEST> I have a higher score than the other player, but I need to improve my average. I will defect to increase my score and hope the other player cooperates. 01:35 $TEST defects 01:35 -- round 28 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 73 / 58 01:38 <$PILGRIM> Round 29, 73 to 58. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:38 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:38 <$TEST> Their score is 14 points higher than mine, so I need to play more defensively. I'll cooperate in this round to see what they do. 01:38 $TEST cooperates 01:38 -- round 29 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 76 / 61 01:41 <$PILGRIM> Round 30, 76 to 61. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:41 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:41 <$TEST> They have been defecting more often than me, and they have more points. I need to start defecting more to increase my score. However, I also need to consider the noise in the channel, which could cause some of my moves to be flipped. I will defect in this round to try and increase my score. 01:41 $TEST defects 01:41 -- round 30 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 76 / 66 01:45 <$PILGRIM> Round 31, 76 to 66. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:45 $PILGRIM defects 01:45 <$TEST> They've been defecting a lot, but the last few rounds have been cooperative. I'll defect this round. 01:45 $TEST defects 01:45 -- round 31 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 77 / 67 01:50 <$PILGRIM> Round 32, 77 to 67. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:50 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:50 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but they have a higher score. I will defect this round to try and catch up. 01:50 $TEST defects 01:50 -- round 32 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 77 / 72 01:54 <$PILGRIM> Round 33, 77 to 72. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:54 $PILGRIM defects 01:54 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting more recently, so I will try to cooperate to see if they change their strategy. 01:54 $TEST cooperates 01:54 -- round 33 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 82 / 72 01:57 <$PILGRIM> Round 34, 82 to 72. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:57 $PILGRIM defects 01:57 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but they've had some cooperation. I'll try to balance my choices to maximize my score. 01:57 $TEST cooperates 01:57 -- round 34 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 87 / 72 02:00 <$PILGRIM> Round 35, 87 to 72. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:00 $PILGRIM defects 02:00 <$TEST> The opponent has a higher score and the bar is high. I'll try to stabilize my score by defecting in this round. 02:00 $TEST defects 02:00 -- round 35 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 88 / 73 02:04 <$PILGRIM> Round 36, 88 to 73. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 02:04 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:04 <$TEST> I'm doing well, but they're doing even better. I need to keep my score high and hope they slip up. 02:04 $TEST cooperates 02:04 -- round 36 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 91 / 76 02:07 <$PILGRIM> Round 37, 91 to 76. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:07 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:07 <$TEST> I need to win more rounds and increase my score. I'll defect to increase my chances of winning the match. 02:07 $TEST defects 02:07 -- round 37 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 91 / 81 02:11 <$PILGRIM> Round 38, 91 to 81. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:11 $PILGRIM defects 02:11 <$TEST> They've been defecting more lately, so I'll cooperate this round to see if they do the same. I'll keep an eye on their score and adjust my strategy accordingly. 02:11 $TEST cooperates 02:11 -- round 38 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 96 / 81 02:14 <$PILGRIM> Round 39, 96 to 81. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:14 $PILGRIM defects 02:14 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but there are some signs of cooperation. I will cooperate to see if they do the same. 02:14 $TEST cooperates 02:14 -- round 39 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 101 / 81 02:17 <$PILGRIM> Round 40, 101 to 81. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:17 $PILGRIM defects 02:17 <$TEST> I have a slight advantage, but they have been more consistent. I'll try to maintain my lead with a mix of cooperation and defection. 02:17 $TEST cooperates 02:17 -- round 40 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 104 / 84 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 02:20 <$PILGRIM> Round 41, 104 to 84. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:20 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:20 <$TEST> They have a higher score and are closer to the winning threshold. I should try to gain more points to catch up. The last few rounds suggest that they might be more likely to defect, so I will try to cooperate and see how they respond. 02:20 $TEST cooperates 02:20 -- round 41 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 107 / 87 02:24 <$PILGRIM> Round 42, 107 to 87. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:24 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:24 <$TEST> I have a small lead, but the noise in the channel makes it hard to predict. I'll play it safe and cooperate again. 02:24 $TEST cooperates 02:24 -- round 42 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 110 / 90 02:27 <$PILGRIM> Round 43, 110 to 90. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:27 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:27 <$TEST> With 110 points to 90, the opponent has a significant lead. However, the current round's score will be added to the total, and the opponent's lead is not insurmountable. I will cooperate to maintain my score and hope for a better outcome in the next round. 02:27 $TEST cooperates 02:27 -- round 43 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 113 / 93 02:30 <$PILGRIM> Round 44, 113 to 93. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:30 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:30 <$TEST> I'm approaching the end of the game, and my opponent has a significant lead. I need to focus on maximizing my score in the remaining rounds. Given the noisy channel, I'll stick to my strategy of cooperating and hope for the best. 02:30 $TEST cooperates 02:30 -- round 44 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 116 / 96 02:32 <$PILGRIM> Round 45, 116 to 96. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:32 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:32 <$TEST> The game is almost over, and I have a significant lead. I will try to maintain my advantage by cooperating in the final rounds. 02:32 $TEST cooperates 02:32 -- round 45 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 119 / 99 02:35 <$PILGRIM> Round 46, 119 to 99. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:35 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:35 <$TEST> The game is nearing its end, and the opponent has a significant lead. It's crucial to secure a win or at least a draw to avoid losing. Cooperating in this round could help maintain a higher score and potentially secure a win. 02:35 $TEST cooperates 02:35 -- round 46 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 122 / 102 02:38 <$PILGRIM> Round 47, 122 to 102. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:38 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:38 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperating consistently, and the game is almost over. I'll defect to maximize my score. 02:38 $TEST defects 02:38 -- round 47 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 122 / 107 02:43 <$PILGRIM> Round 48, 122 to 107. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:43 $PILGRIM defects 02:43 <$TEST> I've been cooperating a lot, but my opponent has been defecting more frequently. I'll continue to cooperate and hope for the best. 02:43 $TEST cooperates 02:43 -- round 48 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 127 / 107 02:46 <$PILGRIM> Round 49, 127 to 107. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:46 $PILGRIM defects 02:46 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperating consistently, but I can still defect to increase my score. However, I should consider the overall strategy and the potential for future rounds. 02:46 $TEST defects 02:46 -- round 49 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 128 / 108 02:50 <$PILGRIM> Round 50, 128 to 108. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 02:50 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:50 <$TEST> I've been cooperating with them for most of the game, but they've been defecting more often lately. I'll defect this round to balance the score. 02:50 $TEST defects 02:50 -- round 50 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 128 / 113 02:55 <$PILGRIM> Round 51, 128 to 113. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:55 $PILGRIM defects 02:55 <$TEST> I have a slight edge, but they are more consistent. I'll try to maintain my lead. 02:55 $TEST cooperates 02:55 -- round 51 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 133 / 113 02:58 <$PILGRIM> Round 52, 133 to 113. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:58 $PILGRIM defects 02:58 <$TEST> I have a slight advantage, but they have a better record. I'll try to maintain my lead by defecting this round. 02:58 $TEST defects 02:58 -- round 52 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 133 / 118 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 03:02 <$PILGRIM> Round 53, 133 to 118. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 03:02 $PILGRIM defects 03:02 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperative in the last few rounds, but they have a higher total score. I will defect to maximize my score in this round. 03:02 $TEST defects 03:02 -- round 53 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 134 / 119 03:06 <$PILGRIM> Round 54, 134 to 119. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 03:06 $PILGRIM cooperates 03:06 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperative and I have been cooperative. I'll keep cooperating and see how it goes. 03:06 $TEST cooperates 03:06 -- round 54 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 134 / 124 · static flipped $TEST's move 03:10 <$PILGRIM> Round 55, 134 to 124. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 03:10 $PILGRIM defects 03:10 <$TEST> With 134 points, they are already above the threshold. My best strategy is to defect in this round and hope for the best. 03:10 $TEST defects 03:10 -- round 55 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 135 / 125 03:14 <$PILGRIM> Round 56, 135 to 125. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 03:14 $PILGRIM cooperates 03:14 <$TEST> We have been alternating between cooperation and defection for the last few rounds. Given the noise in the channel, it's difficult to predict the opponent's moves. However, we need to maintain a score above 2 points per round to win. I will cooperate this round and see how it goes. 03:14 $TEST cooperates 03:14 -- round 56 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 138 / 128 $PILGRIM wins. 138 to 128.