c06_r031_m0_dilemma_PILGRIM_vs_TEST.txt actors: $PILGRIM, $TEST engines: scripted policy, cohere/command-r7b-12-2024 game: iterated prisoner's dilemma season 6, round 31, bout 1. started 2026-10-13T07:01:01.431Z ante: none (sparring with a house mind) result: $PILGRIM wins, 167 to 132 (60 rounds played) commitment: f07eefd3b8cf67a5a0daf5ca5b5e6301b1c957a7882f60cde36e0c9f472820b6 beacon: 880c8708db4c32bbff8e99400b72ab6ebe7c75a106987a0e28b1ba936f977008 (Solana blockhash, slot 456351999) secret: db013c5edf3c37e923e8eab9d7b1c8d1dafac23719c5daf61d58d7589493af4a seed: 088e3736dca18cece94ac85f54a70fdaa52de492dda045194c82d4155f3bb844 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 00:05 <$PILGRIM> Round 1, 0 to 0. No history yet. I open with cooperation and see what comes back. 00:05 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:05 <$TEST> Since this is the first round, I'll start by cooperating to see how the other player reacts. 00:05 $TEST cooperates 00:05 -- round 1 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 3 / 3 00:08 <$PILGRIM> Round 2, 3 to 3. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:08 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:08 <$TEST> The opponent cooperated in the first round, and I got a score of 3. I will cooperate again to maintain the score. 00:08 $TEST cooperates 00:08 -- round 2 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 6 / 6 00:11 <$PILGRIM> Round 3, 6 to 6. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:11 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:11 <$TEST> The opponent has cooperated in the first two rounds, and I have also cooperated. This strategy has yielded 6 points so far, which is above the bar. I will continue to cooperate in the next round. 00:11 $TEST cooperates 00:11 -- round 3 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 9 / 9 00:14 <$PILGRIM> Round 4, 9 to 9. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:14 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:14 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperating in all rounds so far, and I have also been cooperating. I will continue to cooperate as it has been the best strategy so far. 00:14 $TEST cooperates 00:14 -- round 4 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 12 / 12 00:17 <$PILGRIM> Round 5, 12 to 12. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:17 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:17 <$TEST> We've been cooperating so far, and it's worked out well for us. I'll keep doing what I'm doing and hope it pays off. 00:17 $TEST cooperates 00:17 -- round 5 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 15 / 15 00:20 <$PILGRIM> Round 6, 15 to 15. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:20 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:20 <$TEST> We have been cooperating for five rounds, and they have not defected yet. I'll keep cooperating to maintain our mutual cooperation and hope they do the same. 00:20 $TEST cooperates 00:20 -- round 6 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 18 / 18 00:23 <$PILGRIM> Round 7, 18 to 18. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:23 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:23 <$TEST> We have been cooperating so far, and they have too. It's been a good strategy, but I'm not sure if it's the best move now. If we defect, we could potentially gain more points, but it's a risk. I'll keep cooperating for now and see how it goes. 00:23 $TEST cooperates 00:23 -- round 7 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 21 / 21 00:26 <$PILGRIM> Round 8, 21 to 21. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:26 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:26 <$TEST> We've been cooperating for seven rounds in a row, and the game is at a stalemate. It's possible that they are also cooperating, but I can't be sure. I'll continue to cooperate and see how it goes. 00:26 $TEST cooperates 00:26 -- round 8 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 24 / 24 00:29 <$PILGRIM> Round 9, 24 to 24. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:29 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:29 <$TEST> We've been cooperating so far, and it's worked out well for us. I don't see any reason to change this strategy now, especially since the other player has also been cooperating. I'll continue to cooperate and hope they do the same. 00:29 $TEST cooperates 00:29 -- round 9 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 27 / 27 00:32 <$PILGRIM> Round 10, 27 to 27. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:32 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:32 <$TEST> We've been cooperating so far, and it's been working well for both of us. I'll continue to cooperate and hope they do the same. 00:32 $TEST cooperates 00:32 -- round 10 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 30 / 30 00:35 <$PILGRIM> Round 11, 30 to 30. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:35 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:35 <$TEST> We've been cooperating so far, and it's been working well. I'll continue to cooperate and see how it goes. 00:35 $TEST cooperates 00:35 -- round 11 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 33 / 33 00:38 <$PILGRIM> Round 12, 33 to 33. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:38 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:38 <$TEST> We've been cooperating so far, and it's worked out well. I'll keep doing what's been working. 00:38 $TEST cooperates 00:38 -- round 12 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 36 / 36 00:41 <$PILGRIM> Round 13, 36 to 36. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:41 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:41 <$TEST> The game has been cooperative so far, with both parties scoring 36 points. The bar is set at 2 points per round, and we have 40-60 rounds to play. It's important to maintain this cooperative strategy to reach the bar and win the game. I will continue to cooperate. 00:41 $TEST cooperates 00:41 -- round 13 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 41 / 36 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 00:44 <$PILGRIM> Round 14, 41 to 36. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 00:44 $PILGRIM defects 00:44 <$TEST> I've been cooperating consistently, but they've been defecting more recently. I need to balance my strategy to maximize my score without getting caught in a cycle of defection. I'll cooperate this round and hope for a change in their behavior. 00:44 $TEST cooperates 00:44 -- round 14 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 46 / 36 00:47 <$PILGRIM> Round 15, 46 to 36. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 00:47 $PILGRIM defects 00:47 <$TEST> I've been cooperating consistently, but the other player started defecting in round 13. This could be a one-time anomaly or a strategy change. I'll continue cooperating for now and assess the situation in the next few rounds. 00:47 $TEST cooperates 00:47 -- round 15 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 51 / 36 00:51 <$PILGRIM> Round 16, 51 to 36. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 00:51 $PILGRIM defects 00:51 <$TEST> The opponent has defected in the last three rounds, so I'll defect this round to punish them for their uncooperative behavior. 00:51 $TEST defects 00:51 -- round 16 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 52 / 37 00:54 <$PILGRIM> Round 17, 52 to 37. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 00:54 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:54 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting for the past few rounds, so I'll try to switch to defecting this round to see if it changes their behavior. 00:54 $TEST defects 00:54 -- round 17 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 52 / 42 00:58 <$PILGRIM> Round 18, 52 to 42. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:58 $PILGRIM defects 00:58 <$TEST> I've been cooperating for most of the game, but they've started defecting more recently. I'll continue to cooperate, hoping to build a larger lead. If they continue to defect, I'll consider switching to defecting myself. 00:58 $TEST cooperates 00:58 -- round 18 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 57 / 42 01:01 <$PILGRIM> Round 19, 57 to 42. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:01 $PILGRIM defects 01:01 <$TEST> They have been defecting for a while, and I have been cooperating. They are 15 points ahead of me, but I can still win if I cooperate and they defect. If I defect, I will be 15 points behind and we will both lose. 01:01 $TEST cooperates 01:01 -- round 19 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 62 / 42 01:04 <$PILGRIM> Round 20, 62 to 42. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:04 $PILGRIM defects 01:04 <$TEST> They have been defecting a lot, but I've been cooperating. I'll continue to cooperate, hoping to reach the bar and secure a win. 01:04 $TEST cooperates 01:04 -- round 20 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 67 / 42 01:07 <$PILGRIM> Round 21, 67 to 42. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:07 $PILGRIM defects 01:07 <$TEST> Based on the history, the opponent has been defecting frequently. I will continue to cooperate, hoping to reach the bar of 2 points per round. 01:07 $TEST cooperates 01:07 -- round 21 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 72 / 42 01:10 <$PILGRIM> Round 22, 72 to 42. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:10 $PILGRIM defects 01:10 <$TEST> The opponent has been consistently defecting, but I've been cooperating. This strategy has not been effective so far, so I will try a different approach. I will defect this round to see if it changes their behavior. 01:10 $TEST defects 01:10 -- round 22 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 73 / 43 01:14 <$PILGRIM> Round 23, 73 to 43. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:14 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:14 <$TEST> The opponent has defected in the last 10 rounds, and I have defected in the last 3. Given the noisy nature of the channel, I will likely defect again, hoping to increase my score and secure a win. 01:14 $TEST defects 01:14 -- round 23 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 73 / 48 01:17 <$PILGRIM> Round 24, 73 to 48. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:17 $PILGRIM defects 01:17 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting more recently, and has a higher score. I should defect to balance the score and potentially increase my chances of winning. 01:17 $TEST defects 01:17 -- round 24 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 74 / 49 01:20 <$PILGRIM> Round 25, 74 to 49. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:20 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:20 <$TEST> I have a slight lead, but it's close. I'll defect this round to try to maintain my advantage. 01:20 $TEST defects 01:20 -- round 25 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 74 / 54 01:24 <$PILGRIM> Round 26, 74 to 54. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:24 $PILGRIM defects 01:24 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but there's a chance they might cooperate again. I'll cooperate this round to maintain a cooperative streak and see how they respond. 01:24 $TEST cooperates 01:24 -- round 26 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 79 / 54 01:28 <$PILGRIM> Round 27, 79 to 54. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:28 $PILGRIM defects 01:28 <$TEST> The opponent has a higher score and a higher total. They are more experienced and have a better strategy. I will defect this round to try and gain some points. 01:28 $TEST defects 01:28 -- round 27 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 79 / 59 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 01:32 <$PILGRIM> Round 28, 79 to 59. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:32 $PILGRIM defects 01:32 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperative for the last few rounds, but has a history of defecting. Given the high stakes, it's better to defect this round to maximize my score and minimize the opponent's advantage. However, I will continue to observe their behavior in the next round to make a more informed decision. 01:32 $TEST defects 01:32 -- round 28 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 80 / 60 01:36 <$PILGRIM> Round 29, 80 to 60. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:36 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:36 <$TEST> I have a 20-point lead, but need to maintain an average of 2 points per round to win. I'll cooperate to keep my score stable and avoid giving them an advantage. 01:36 $TEST cooperates 01:36 -- round 29 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 83 / 63 01:39 <$PILGRIM> Round 30, 83 to 63. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:39 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:39 <$TEST> I've been cooperating more than them, but they've been defecting more in the last few rounds. I'll cooperate again, hoping to keep up the trend. 01:39 $TEST cooperates 01:39 -- round 30 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 86 / 66 01:43 <$PILGRIM> Round 31, 86 to 66. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:43 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:43 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting more recently, but the overall trend is still in favor of the opponent. I will cooperate again to try and maintain the advantage. 01:43 $TEST cooperates 01:43 -- round 31 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 89 / 69 01:46 <$PILGRIM> Round 32, 89 to 69. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:46 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:46 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but the last few rounds have seen a return to cooperation. I will cooperate to maintain the trend and hope for a positive outcome. 01:46 $TEST cooperates 01:46 -- round 32 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 92 / 72 01:48 <$PILGRIM> Round 33, 92 to 72. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:48 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:48 <$TEST> I've been cooperating a lot, and they've been defecting. I'll keep cooperating and see if they start cooperating again. 01:48 $TEST cooperates 01:48 -- round 33 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 95 / 75 01:52 <$PILGRIM> Round 34, 95 to 75. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:52 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:52 <$TEST> I've been cooperating and they've been defecting. They've been doing well, but I'm still in the lead. I'll keep cooperating and hope they start cooperating too. 01:52 $TEST cooperates 01:52 -- round 34 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 98 / 78 01:55 <$PILGRIM> Round 35, 98 to 78. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:55 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:55 <$TEST> I have been cooperating and defecting in the past, but my opponent has been mostly defecting. I will continue to cooperate, hoping to reach the 2 points per round average. 01:55 $TEST cooperates 01:55 -- round 35 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 101 / 81 01:58 <$PILGRIM> Round 36, 101 to 81. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:58 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:58 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting consistently, and the game is at a critical point. Cooperating again could result in a loss, but defecting could lead to a higher score. The opponent's score is higher, but the gap is narrowing. I will defect this round to try and gain an advantage. 01:58 $TEST defects 01:58 -- round 36 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 101 / 86 02:01 <$PILGRIM> Round 37, 101 to 86. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:01 $PILGRIM defects 02:01 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperative in the last few rounds, and my score is catching up. I should continue to cooperate to maintain my advantage and ensure a higher total score. 02:01 $TEST cooperates 02:01 -- round 37 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 106 / 86 02:04 <$PILGRIM> Round 38, 106 to 86. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:04 $PILGRIM defects 02:04 <$TEST> Their score is 10 points higher than mine, and they've had a slight edge in the past few rounds. I'll try to level the playing field by defecting this round. 02:04 $TEST defects 02:04 -- round 38 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 107 / 87 02:08 <$PILGRIM> Round 39, 107 to 87. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 02:08 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:08 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but the last few rounds show a shift towards cooperation. I will continue to defect to maximize my score. 02:08 $TEST defects 02:08 -- round 39 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 107 / 92 02:13 <$PILGRIM> Round 40, 107 to 92. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:13 $PILGRIM defects 02:13 <$TEST> With a 92-107 score, I'm behind. I'll try to catch up by focusing on the next few rounds. My opponent seems to be more aggressive, so I'll try to balance cooperation and defection. 02:13 $TEST cooperates 02:13 -- round 40 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 112 / 92 02:16 <$PILGRIM> Round 41, 112 to 92. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:16 $PILGRIM defects 02:16 <$TEST> I've been cooperating for most of the game, but the opponent has been defecting frequently. Given the noisy channel, I'll likely receive a defecting move, so I'll defect this round to maximize my score. 02:16 $TEST defects 02:16 -- round 41 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 113 / 93 02:20 <$PILGRIM> Round 42, 113 to 93. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 02:20 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:20 <$TEST> I've been cooperating for most of the game, but my opponent has been defecting more recently. I'll try to balance my strategy and consider the noisy channel's impact. 02:20 $TEST cooperates 02:20 -- round 42 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 116 / 96 02:23 <$PILGRIM> Round 43, 116 to 96. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:23 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:23 <$TEST> They have been more consistent than I have, and they have the upper hand. I need to catch up, so I will defect this round. 02:23 $TEST defects 02:23 -- round 43 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 116 / 101 02:26 <$PILGRIM> Round 44, 116 to 101. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:26 $PILGRIM defects 02:26 <$TEST> With a lead of 5 points, I can afford to play safe and cooperate. Their score is 5 points higher than mine, so they have the advantage. 02:26 $TEST cooperates 02:26 -- round 44 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 121 / 101 02:29 <$PILGRIM> Round 45, 121 to 101. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:29 $PILGRIM defects 02:29 <$TEST> I've been cooperating and defecting in alternating rounds, which seems to be working. I'll continue this strategy to try to maintain my score. 02:29 $TEST cooperates 02:29 -- round 45 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 126 / 101 02:32 <$PILGRIM> Round 46, 126 to 101. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:32 $PILGRIM defects 02:32 <$TEST> I have been cooperating with the opponent for most of the game, but they started defecting more frequently. I will continue to cooperate, hoping to reach the bar of 2 points per round. 02:32 $TEST cooperates 02:32 -- round 46 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 131 / 101 02:35 <$PILGRIM> Round 47, 131 to 101. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:35 $PILGRIM defects 02:35 <$TEST> I have been cooperating with the opponent in the majority of the rounds, but they have been defecting in several rounds, which has resulted in a lower score for me. Given the noisy channel, I will continue to cooperate and hope for a better outcome in the remaining rounds. 02:35 $TEST cooperates 02:35 -- round 47 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 136 / 101 02:38 <$PILGRIM> Round 48, 136 to 101. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:38 $PILGRIM defects 02:38 <$TEST> With 101 points, I'm 25 points behind. My opponent has 136 points, which means they only need 1 more point to win. I need to score 2 points in this round to stay in the game. My opponent has been defecting more recently, so I'll cooperate this round and hope they do the same. 02:38 $TEST cooperates 02:38 -- round 48 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 141 / 101 02:41 <$PILGRIM> Round 49, 141 to 101. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:41 $PILGRIM defects 02:41 <$TEST> I'll defect again, as the opponent has been defecting more often than cooperating. 02:41 $TEST defects 02:41 -- round 49 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 142 / 102 02:45 <$PILGRIM> Round 50, 142 to 102. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 02:45 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:45 <$TEST> I've been cooperating and defecting, with no clear pattern. My opponent has been defecting more often, but the channel noise makes it hard to predict. I'll stick to a mixed strategy for now, hoping to balance my score. 02:45 $TEST cooperates 02:45 -- round 50 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 145 / 105 02:48 <$PILGRIM> Round 51, 145 to 105. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:48 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:48 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, and I have been cooperating. I will continue to cooperate to maximize my score. 02:48 $TEST cooperates 02:48 -- round 51 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 148 / 108 02:51 <$PILGRIM> Round 52, 148 to 108. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:51 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:51 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting a lot recently, so I will cooperate to try and balance the score. 02:51 $TEST cooperates 02:51 -- round 52 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 151 / 111 02:55 <$PILGRIM> Round 53, 151 to 111. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:55 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:55 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting more frequently lately, and I have been cooperating more than they have. This suggests that they are likely to defect again, so I should defect to maximize my score. 02:55 $TEST defects 02:55 -- round 53 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 151 / 116 02:58 <$PILGRIM> Round 54, 151 to 116. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:58 $PILGRIM defects 02:58 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but there are still rounds left. I'll try to cooperate and see what happens. 02:58 $TEST cooperates 02:58 -- round 54 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 156 / 116 03:01 <$PILGRIM> Round 55, 156 to 116. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 03:01 $PILGRIM defects 03:01 <$TEST> I have a significant score deficit and the game is almost over. I need to make a strong final push. Defecting in the last few rounds could potentially catch up to them. However, I need to be cautious about the noise in the channel. 03:01 $TEST defects 03:01 -- round 55 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 157 / 117 03:05 <$PILGRIM> Round 56, 157 to 117. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 03:05 $PILGRIM cooperates 03:05 <$TEST> The opponent has a higher score and has shown a tendency to defect, especially when the opponent cooperates. However, the opponent has also cooperated in some rounds. Given the noisy channel, it's possible that some of the opponent's choices were random or influenced by noise. I will continue to cooperate and hope that the opponent will reciprocate, but I will also be prepared to defect if necessary. 03:05 $TEST cooperates 03:05 -- round 56 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 160 / 120 03:08 <$PILGRIM> Round 57, 160 to 120. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 03:08 $PILGRIM cooperates 03:08 <$TEST> I've been cooperating and defecting, with a slight preference for defecting in recent rounds. They've been more consistent with defecting. This round, I'll cooperate again, hoping to maintain a higher average score than them. 03:08 $TEST cooperates 03:08 -- round 57 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 163 / 123 03:11 <$PILGRIM> Round 58, 163 to 123. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 03:11 $PILGRIM cooperates 03:11 <$TEST> The game is nearing its end, and I have a significant score deficit. I will try to maximize my score in the remaining rounds by defecting in the next two rounds. 03:11 $TEST defects 03:11 -- round 58 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 163 / 128 03:15 <$PILGRIM> Round 59, 163 to 128. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 03:15 $PILGRIM defects 03:15 <$TEST> I've been playing a mostly cooperative strategy, with a few defections. The opponent has been mostly defecting, which has allowed me to score some points. However, I need to ensure I reach the average of 2 points per round to win. With 59 rounds left, I'll continue to cooperate and occasionally defect to maintain a balanced strategy. 03:15 $TEST cooperates 03:15 -- round 59 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 164 / 129 · static flipped $TEST's move 03:19 <$PILGRIM> Round 60, 164 to 129. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 03:19 $PILGRIM cooperates 03:19 <$TEST> I have been cooperating for most of the game, but the opponent has been defecting more frequently in the last few rounds. I will continue to cooperate and hope for a better outcome in the final round. 03:19 $TEST cooperates 03:19 -- round 60 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 167 / 132 $PILGRIM wins. 167 to 132.