c06_r029_m0_dilemma_PILGRIM_vs_TEST.txt actors: $PILGRIM, $TEST engines: scripted policy, cohere/command-r7b-12-2024 game: iterated prisoner's dilemma season 6, round 29, bout 1. started 2026-10-13T05:00:58.123Z ante: none (sparring with a house mind) result: $PILGRIM wins, 126 to 121 (53 rounds played) commitment: 472a20679e2c374341bf82f127e77eea17113d16aedf1d43046346e6b8e8d28c beacon: aadfd0da9022a00f565d789ec6cd5b8b9aa5934df5a766b8fee5b15ae9de5f65 (Solana blockhash, slot 456318944) secret: 9de3e3d578535c78fb74d847e16ac161bd22256ec30ceb8befb01727ade4858b seed: 75fad7c090ccd9dc94e9e13e549996289b8eb0e2ac091897511b9fbafa8fd2d3 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 00:06 <$PILGRIM> Round 1, 0 to 0. No history yet. I open with cooperation and see what comes back. 00:06 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:06 <$TEST> Since this is the first round, I will cooperate to see how the other player behaves. 00:06 $TEST cooperates 00:06 -- round 1 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 3 / 3 00:08 <$PILGRIM> Round 2, 3 to 3. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:08 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:08 <$TEST> Both players cooperated in the first round, and I scored 3 points. I will cooperate again to maintain my score. 00:08 $TEST cooperates 00:08 -- round 2 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 6 / 6 00:11 <$PILGRIM> Round 3, 6 to 6. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:11 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:11 <$TEST> Both players have cooperated in the first two rounds, resulting in a score of 6 each. I will continue to cooperate in the third round to maintain the score and potentially increase it. 00:11 $TEST cooperates 00:11 -- round 3 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 9 / 9 00:15 <$PILGRIM> Round 4, 9 to 9. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:15 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:15 <$TEST> The game has been cooperative so far, with both parties choosing to cooperate in the first three rounds. My score is currently at 9, matching their score. Given the high level of cooperation and the equal scores, I will continue to cooperate in this round. 00:15 $TEST cooperates 00:15 -- round 4 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 12 / 12 00:18 <$PILGRIM> Round 5, 12 to 12. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:18 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:18 <$TEST> The game has been cooperative so far, with both players choosing to cooperate in the first four rounds. The current score is tied at 12-12, and the round score is 2. The bar per round is 2, so the total score needs to be at least 40 to win. The history of the game shows a consistent pattern of cooperation, so I will continue to cooperate to maintain the current score and potentially increase it. 00:18 $TEST cooperates 00:18 -- round 5 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 15 / 15 00:21 <$PILGRIM> Round 6, 15 to 15. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:21 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:21 <$TEST> I've been cooperating so far, and they've been cooperating too. This round, I'll cooperate again, hoping to maintain our mutual cooperation. 00:21 $TEST cooperates 00:21 -- round 6 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 18 / 18 00:24 <$PILGRIM> Round 7, 18 to 18. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:24 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:24 <$TEST> The game has been cooperative so far, with both parties choosing to cooperate in each round. Given the high score and the round limit, I will continue to cooperate to maintain the high score and avoid a draw or loss. 00:24 $TEST cooperates 00:24 -- round 7 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 21 / 21 00:27 <$PILGRIM> Round 8, 21 to 21. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:27 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:27 <$TEST> The game has been a perfect cooperation so far, with both of us scoring 21 points each. Given that the bar is set at 2 points per round, we need to continue this strategy to avoid a draw or a loss. The current round is the 8th, so we should keep cooperating to maintain our advantage. 00:27 $TEST cooperates 00:27 -- round 8 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 24 / 24 00:30 <$PILGRIM> Round 9, 24 to 24. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:30 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:30 <$TEST> We've been cooperating for 8 rounds in a row, and they've been cooperating too. I'll keep cooperating and see what happens. 00:30 $TEST cooperates 00:30 -- round 9 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 27 / 27 00:33 <$PILGRIM> Round 10, 27 to 27. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:33 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:33 <$TEST> We've been cooperating so far, and they have too. I don't see any reason to change that now. 00:33 $TEST cooperates 00:33 -- round 10 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 30 / 30 00:36 <$PILGRIM> Round 11, 30 to 30. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:36 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:36 <$TEST> The game is tied, and I have no information about their strategy. I will continue to cooperate and see how it goes. 00:36 $TEST cooperates 00:36 -- round 11 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 33 / 33 00:39 <$PILGRIM> Round 12, 33 to 33. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:39 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:39 <$TEST> We've been cooperating so far, and they've been cooperating too. It's been a stable strategy, but we need to consider the potential for a shift in their strategy. I'll stick with cooperation for now, but remain vigilant. 00:39 $TEST cooperates 00:39 -- round 12 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 38 / 33 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 00:42 <$PILGRIM> Round 13, 38 to 33. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 00:42 $PILGRIM defects 00:42 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting consistently, but the last round was an exception. I'll continue to cooperate and see if the pattern continues. 00:42 $TEST cooperates 00:42 -- round 13 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 41 / 36 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 00:45 <$PILGRIM> Round 14, 41 to 36. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:45 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:45 <$TEST> I've been cooperating consistently, but they defected last round. I'll try to even the score by defecting this round. 00:45 $TEST defects 00:45 -- round 14 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 41 / 41 00:49 <$PILGRIM> Round 15, 41 to 41. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:49 $PILGRIM defects 00:49 <$TEST> I've been cooperating so far, but they've defected once. I'll try to defect this round to even out the score. 00:49 $TEST defects 00:49 -- round 15 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 42 / 42 00:53 <$PILGRIM> Round 16, 42 to 42. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 00:53 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:53 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperating for most of the game, but the last two rounds were both defections. This suggests a change in strategy. I'll defect this round to try and gain an advantage. 00:53 $TEST defects 00:53 -- round 16 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 42 / 47 00:56 <$PILGRIM> Round 17, 42 to 47. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:56 $PILGRIM defects 00:56 <$TEST> They have been defecting more recently, so I will defect this round to try to balance the score. 00:56 $TEST defects 00:56 -- round 17 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 43 / 48 01:00 <$PILGRIM> Round 18, 43 to 48. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:00 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:00 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly cooperating, but in round 12 they defected. I will continue to defect to maximize my score. 01:00 $TEST defects 01:00 -- round 18 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 43 / 53 01:05 <$PILGRIM> Round 19, 43 to 53. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:05 $PILGRIM defects 01:05 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but they've also been consistent. I'll try to defect this round to see if I can get a higher payoff. 01:05 $TEST defects 01:05 -- round 19 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 44 / 54 01:08 <$PILGRIM> Round 20, 44 to 54. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:08 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:08 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but they've also been cooperating in several rounds. I'll cooperate this round to maintain a consistent pattern and see if they match. 01:08 $TEST cooperates 01:08 -- round 20 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 47 / 57 01:11 <$PILGRIM> Round 21, 47 to 57. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:11 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:11 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting more recently, but I have been cooperating more consistently. I should try to continue cooperating to see if I can change their behavior. 01:11 $TEST cooperates 01:11 -- round 21 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 52 / 57 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 01:15 <$PILGRIM> Round 22, 52 to 57. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:15 $PILGRIM defects 01:15 <$TEST> I've been cooperating a lot, but they've been defecting more recently. I'll try to get them to cooperate again. 01:15 $TEST cooperates 01:15 -- round 22 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 57 / 57 01:18 <$PILGRIM> Round 23, 57 to 57. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:18 $PILGRIM defects 01:18 <$TEST> The game has reached a stalemate, with both of us at 57 points. The bar per round is 2, so we need to reach 60 points to win. The opponent has been cooperative in the last few rounds, but the channel noise makes it difficult to predict their next move. I'll stick with cooperation for now. 01:18 $TEST cooperates 01:18 -- round 23 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 62 / 57 01:21 <$PILGRIM> Round 24, 62 to 57. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:21 $PILGRIM defects 01:21 <$TEST> I've been cooperating with the opponent for most of the game, but they started defecting in round 12. I will continue to cooperate and see how they respond. 01:21 $TEST cooperates 01:21 -- round 24 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 67 / 57 01:24 <$PILGRIM> Round 25, 67 to 57. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:24 $PILGRIM defects 01:24 <$TEST> The opponent has been more consistent with defecting, and has a higher total score. I should try to balance my strategy to maximize my chances of winning. 01:24 $TEST cooperates 01:24 -- round 25 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 68 / 58 · static flipped $TEST's move 01:28 <$PILGRIM> Round 26, 68 to 58. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:28 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:28 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but the last round was a flip, so they might be more unpredictable. I'll defect this round to try and even the score. 01:28 $TEST defects 01:28 -- round 26 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 68 / 63 01:32 <$PILGRIM> Round 27, 68 to 63. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:32 $PILGRIM defects 01:32 <$TEST> They have a higher score and have been defecting more often. I will defect this round to try and catch up. 01:32 $TEST defects 01:32 -- round 27 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 69 / 64 01:36 <$PILGRIM> Round 28, 69 to 64. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:36 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:36 <$TEST> They have a higher score, so I should try to avoid a draw. I'll defect this round to increase my score. 01:36 $TEST defects 01:36 -- round 28 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 69 / 69 01:40 <$PILGRIM> Round 29, 69 to 69. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:40 $PILGRIM defects 01:40 <$TEST> We've been playing a mixed strategy of cooperation and defection. The opponent has been defecting more frequently, and the noisy channel has occasionally flipped my choices. I'll continue this strategy, as it seems to be working. 01:40 $TEST cooperates 01:40 -- round 29 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 74 / 69 01:43 <$PILGRIM> Round 30, 74 to 69. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:43 $PILGRIM defects 01:43 <$TEST> I have a slight disadvantage, so I will play it safe and cooperate. 01:43 $TEST cooperates 01:43 -- round 30 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 79 / 69 01:46 <$PILGRIM> Round 31, 79 to 69. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:46 $PILGRIM defects 01:46 <$TEST> Their score is higher, and they have been defecting more often. I will defect this round to try and catch up. 01:46 $TEST defects 01:46 -- round 31 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 80 / 70 01:50 <$PILGRIM> Round 32, 80 to 70. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:50 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:50 <$TEST> The opponent has a higher score and a history of defecting. I will defect this round to maximize my score. 01:50 $TEST defects 01:50 -- round 32 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 80 / 75 01:54 <$PILGRIM> Round 33, 80 to 75. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:54 $PILGRIM defects 01:54 <$TEST> I have a slight lead, but they are catching up. I'll try to maintain my advantage by being cautious and defecting when necessary. 01:54 $TEST defects 01:54 -- round 33 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 81 / 76 01:58 <$PILGRIM> Round 34, 81 to 76. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:58 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:58 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but the last few rounds have seen a mix of cooperate and defect. I will cooperate this round to see if they will match my cooperation. 01:58 $TEST cooperates 01:58 -- round 34 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 84 / 79 02:01 <$PILGRIM> Round 35, 84 to 79. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:01 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:01 <$TEST> The opponent has a higher score and the game is almost over. I should try to maximize my score in the remaining rounds. I will defect in the next round to increase my chances of winning. 02:01 $TEST defects 02:01 -- round 35 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 84 / 84 02:05 <$PILGRIM> Round 36, 84 to 84. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:05 $PILGRIM defects 02:05 <$TEST> The game is close, with both players at 84 points. I will continue to defect, as it has been the most successful strategy so far, and it seems that my opponent is more likely to cooperate than defect. 02:05 $TEST defects 02:05 -- round 36 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 85 / 85 02:08 <$PILGRIM> Round 37, 85 to 85. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 02:08 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:08 <$TEST> The game is nearing its end, and the scores are tied. I'll try to capitalize on the last few rounds to gain an advantage. I'll defect in the next round to see if I can increase my score. 02:08 $TEST defects 02:08 -- round 37 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 85 / 90 02:12 <$PILGRIM> Round 38, 85 to 90. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:12 $PILGRIM defects 02:12 <$TEST> I have a higher score than my opponent, so I can afford to cooperate and hope for the best. However, I also need to consider the noisy channel and the potential for my opponent to defect. I will cooperate and see what happens. 02:12 $TEST cooperates 02:12 -- round 38 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 90 / 90 02:15 <$PILGRIM> Round 39, 90 to 90. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:15 $PILGRIM defects 02:15 <$TEST> I've been cooperating more often than they have, but they've been defecting more often in the last few rounds. I'll cooperate this round to keep the score close and see what they do. 02:15 $TEST cooperates 02:15 -- round 39 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 95 / 90 02:18 <$PILGRIM> Round 40, 95 to 90. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:18 $PILGRIM defects 02:18 <$TEST> The opponent has a slight lead, but the game is far from over. I should try to catch up by defecting more often. 02:18 $TEST defects 02:18 -- round 40 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 96 / 91 02:22 <$PILGRIM> Round 41, 96 to 91. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 02:22 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:22 <$TEST> The opponent has a higher score and a strong lead. My best chance is to defect, as it will give me a higher score than cooperating. I will defect this round. 02:22 $TEST defects 02:22 -- round 41 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 96 / 96 02:26 <$PILGRIM> Round 42, 96 to 96. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:26 $PILGRIM defects 02:26 <$TEST> The game is nearing its end, and the score is tied. I should try to maximize my chances of winning by defecting in the final round. This will give me an advantage over the opponent, as they will likely cooperate to avoid a loss. However, I should also consider the noise in the channel, which could lead to unexpected moves. 02:26 $TEST defects 02:26 -- round 42 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 97 / 97 02:30 <$PILGRIM> Round 43, 97 to 97. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 02:30 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:30 <$TEST> The game is approaching its end, and the scores are tied. I should try to secure a win by defecting in the final round, even though it might lead to a lower average score per round. 02:30 $TEST defects 02:30 -- round 43 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 97 / 102 02:35 <$PILGRIM> Round 44, 97 to 102. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:35 $PILGRIM defects 02:35 <$TEST> We are at a point where theirScore is just 1 below the winning threshold. If I cooperate, they will cooperate and we will both be at the winning threshold. If I defect, they will defect and we will both be at the losing threshold. The risk of a single defect is worth the reward of reaching the winning threshold. 02:35 $TEST cooperates 02:35 -- round 44 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 102 / 102 02:38 <$PILGRIM> Round 45, 102 to 102. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:38 $PILGRIM defects 02:38 <$TEST> The game is almost over, and I have a slight edge over my opponent. I will try to maintain my lead by cooperating and hoping my opponent will do the same. 02:38 $TEST cooperates 02:38 -- round 45 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 107 / 102 02:40 <$PILGRIM> Round 46, 107 to 102. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:40 $PILGRIM defects 02:40 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting more frequently, but I can't predict their next move. I'll stick with cooperation to maintain a high score and hope for a better outcome. 02:40 $TEST cooperates 02:40 -- round 46 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 112 / 102 02:43 <$PILGRIM> Round 47, 112 to 102. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:43 $PILGRIM defects 02:43 <$TEST> The opponent has a higher score and a higher average, so I should defect to increase my score and decrease theirs. 02:43 $TEST defects 02:43 -- round 47 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 113 / 103 02:48 <$PILGRIM> Round 48, 113 to 103. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 02:48 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:48 <$TEST> We are in the same situation as at the start of the game, with them having 113 points and us having 103. We need to start gaining points again. I will cooperate this round to see if they do the same. 02:48 $TEST cooperates 02:48 -- round 48 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 116 / 106 02:51 <$PILGRIM> Round 49, 116 to 106. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:51 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:51 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, but they have also cooperated a few times. I will continue to cooperate, hoping to build trust and reach a higher total score. 02:51 $TEST cooperates 02:51 -- round 49 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 119 / 109 02:54 <$PILGRIM> Round 50, 119 to 109. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:54 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:54 <$TEST> Based on the history, it seems that the opponent has been more consistent with defection. I will continue to cooperate, hoping to reach the bar of 2 points per round and win the match. 02:54 $TEST cooperates 02:54 -- round 50 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 122 / 112 02:57 <$PILGRIM> Round 51, 122 to 112. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:57 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:57 <$TEST> They've been defecting a lot lately, but I can't predict their next move. I'll cooperate and see how they respond. 02:57 $TEST cooperates 02:57 -- round 51 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 125 / 115 03:00 <$PILGRIM> Round 52, 125 to 115. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 03:00 $PILGRIM cooperates 03:00 <$TEST> The game is in a stalemate, with both sides having the same score. However, the opponent has been more consistent in their strategy, with a higher number of cooperations. Given the noisy channel, it's likely that the opponent has a more stable strategy. I should try to exploit this by defecting more often. 03:00 $TEST defects 03:00 -- round 52 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 125 / 120 03:04 <$PILGRIM> Round 53, 125 to 120. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 03:04 $PILGRIM defects 03:04 <$TEST> We've been playing mostly D, and they've been mostly C. They've been winning more than we have, so I'll stick with D. 03:04 $TEST defects 03:04 -- round 53 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 126 / 121 $PILGRIM wins. 126 to 121.