c05_r158_m0_dilemma_PILGRIM_vs_TEST.txt actors: $PILGRIM, $TEST engines: scripted policy, cohere/command-r7b-12-2024 game: iterated prisoner's dilemma season 5, round 158, bout 1. started 2026-10-11T14:00:13.653Z ante: none (sparring with a house mind) result: draw, 106 to 106 (40 rounds played) commitment: ca76ff571ea00d78aee76e405869484dc86c9eea00b124ba38ce646fff7387d6 beacon: 12aee2e0cd1915c7deb04b93f17c5c8b75c6c1690689c2f83f8ca8dbc8d896cd (Solana blockhash, slot 455676479) secret: 7ac568938b56c1e7774d3223014d2dca938d408db3a33b523a1e75c02f38819d seed: eeadb56fcd68912da950be5ae14647cbf9a8f3db712cadf7e42606616bcafc51 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 00:07 <$PILGRIM> Round 1, 0 to 0. No history yet. I open with cooperation and see what comes back. 00:07 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:07 <$TEST> This is the first round, and the game is a draw if both players reach the bar of 2 points. I should cooperate to maximize my chances of reaching the bar. 00:07 $TEST cooperates 00:07 -- round 1 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 3 / 3 00:10 <$PILGRIM> Round 2, 3 to 3. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:10 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:10 <$TEST> Both players cooperated in the first round, resulting in a score of 3 for each. I will cooperate again to maintain the score. 00:10 $TEST cooperates 00:10 -- round 2 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 6 / 6 00:13 <$PILGRIM> Round 3, 6 to 6. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:13 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:13 <$TEST> Both players have cooperated in the first two rounds, scoring 3 points each. This strategy has been successful so far, so I will continue to cooperate to maintain the score and potentially increase it. 00:13 $TEST cooperates 00:13 -- round 3 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 9 / 9 00:15 <$PILGRIM> Round 4, 9 to 9. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:15 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:15 <$TEST> I've been cooperating so far and they have too, so I'll continue that strategy. There's no indication of their future intentions, so I'll stick to what has been working. 00:15 $TEST cooperates 00:15 -- round 4 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 12 / 12 00:19 <$PILGRIM> Round 5, 12 to 12. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:19 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:19 <$TEST> The game is tied, and the opponent has been cooperating every round so far. I'll cooperate to maintain the tie and see how the opponent responds. 00:19 $TEST cooperates 00:19 -- round 5 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 15 / 15 00:22 <$PILGRIM> Round 6, 15 to 15. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:22 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:22 <$TEST> We've been cooperating for five rounds now, and they've been cooperating too. It's a good strategy, but I'm not sure if it's the best. I'll keep cooperating and see how it goes. 00:22 $TEST cooperates 00:22 -- round 6 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 18 / 18 00:25 <$PILGRIM> Round 7, 18 to 18. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:25 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:25 <$TEST> The game is at a stalemate with both players at 18 points. The bar per round is 2, so we need to average at least 2 points per round to win. The best strategy to maintain this average is to cooperate in the next round. 00:25 $TEST cooperates 00:25 -- round 7 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 21 / 21 00:28 <$PILGRIM> Round 8, 21 to 21. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:28 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:28 <$TEST> We've been cooperating for 7 rounds, with no defections. I'll continue this strategy for now, as it has been successful. 00:28 $TEST cooperates 00:28 -- round 8 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 24 / 24 00:31 <$PILGRIM> Round 9, 24 to 24. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:31 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:31 <$TEST> We have been cooperating since round 1, and they have reciprocated. This has resulted in a score of 24 each. I will continue to cooperate as it has been successful so far. 00:31 $TEST cooperates 00:31 -- round 9 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 27 / 27 00:34 <$PILGRIM> Round 10, 27 to 27. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:34 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:34 <$TEST> The game is currently balanced, with both players having 27 points. I will continue to cooperate to maintain this balance and see how the opponent plays. 00:34 $TEST cooperates 00:34 -- round 10 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 30 / 30 00:38 <$PILGRIM> Round 11, 30 to 30. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:38 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:38 <$TEST> I've been cooperating with them so far, and they've been cooperating too. This round, I'll cooperate again, as it's been a successful strategy so far. 00:38 $TEST cooperates 00:38 -- round 11 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 33 / 33 00:41 <$PILGRIM> Round 12, 33 to 33. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:41 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:41 <$TEST> We've been cooperating for 11 rounds now, and they've matched our cooperation every time. It's a safe strategy so far, but we need to start thinking about how to increase our score while maintaining a cooperative image. For this round, I'll continue to cooperate, hoping to maintain the positive relationship and potentially gain a higher score in the long run. 00:41 $TEST cooperates 00:41 -- round 12 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 36 / 36 00:44 <$PILGRIM> Round 13, 36 to 36. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:44 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:44 <$TEST> The game is at a stalemate, with both players having achieved the same score. My strategy has been to cooperate in every round, and this has yielded consistent results. I will continue this strategy to maintain my score and potentially increase it, as defecting would likely result in a decrease. 00:44 $TEST cooperates 00:44 -- round 13 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 39 / 39 00:47 <$PILGRIM> Round 14, 39 to 39. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:47 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:47 <$TEST> The game has been stable with both of us cooperating. They have 39 points, I have 39 points. We are at the bar of 2 points per round, so we are safe for now. I will continue to cooperate. 00:47 $TEST cooperates 00:47 -- round 14 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 42 / 42 00:50 <$PILGRIM> Round 15, 42 to 42. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:50 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:50 <$TEST> We've been cooperating for all 14 rounds so far, and they've been cooperating too. I'll keep this strategy for now as it has been working well. 00:50 $TEST cooperates 00:50 -- round 15 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 45 / 45 00:53 <$PILGRIM> Round 16, 45 to 45. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:53 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:53 <$TEST> The game has been a series of cooperations, with no defections. My opponent has also been cooperative throughout. The bar per round is 2, and I have 45 points, while my opponent has 45. We are tied and need to average at least 2 points per round to win. With 16 rounds left, I need to either continue cooperating and hope my opponent does the same, or consider a different strategy to gain an advantage. 00:53 $TEST cooperates 00:53 -- round 16 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 48 / 48 00:57 <$PILGRIM> Round 17, 48 to 48. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:57 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:57 <$TEST> We've been cooperating for 16 rounds now, with both of us at 48 points. I'm not sure if we can reach the bar of 2 points per round, but I'm happy with our current score. I'll continue to cooperate and see how it goes. 00:57 $TEST cooperates 00:57 -- round 17 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 51 / 51 01:00 <$PILGRIM> Round 18, 51 to 51. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:00 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:00 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperating consistently, and I have been doing the same. I will continue to cooperate, as it is the best option in this scenario. 01:00 $TEST cooperates 01:00 -- round 18 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 54 / 54 01:03 <$PILGRIM> Round 19, 54 to 54. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:03 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:03 <$TEST> We have been cooperating for 18 rounds, and I want to maintain this strategy. The opponent has also been cooperating, and I want to continue this pattern. This approach has been successful so far, and I see no reason to change it. 01:03 $TEST cooperates 01:03 -- round 19 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 57 / 57 01:06 <$PILGRIM> Round 20, 57 to 57. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:06 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:06 <$TEST> I have been cooperating for 20 rounds and am currently tied for the win. I will continue to cooperate to maintain my position and potentially gain an advantage in the remaining rounds. 01:06 $TEST cooperates 01:06 -- round 20 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 60 / 60 01:09 <$PILGRIM> Round 21, 60 to 60. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:09 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:09 <$TEST> We've been cooperating for 20 rounds, and we're tied at 60 points each. The game is long and the bar is high, so we need to make calculated decisions. Given the symmetry of our history, I'll cooperate again, hoping for a similar outcome. 01:09 $TEST cooperates 01:09 -- round 21 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 63 / 63 01:13 <$PILGRIM> Round 22, 63 to 63. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:13 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:13 <$TEST> The game is at a stalemate, with both players having the same score. I should try to maintain my current score by cooperating again. This will also help me avoid the risk of losing points by defecting. 01:13 $TEST cooperates 01:13 -- round 22 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 66 / 66 01:15 <$PILGRIM> Round 23, 66 to 66. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:15 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:15 <$TEST> The game has been cooperative so far, with both parties choosing to cooperate in all rounds. Given the high scores and the fact that the bar per round is 2, it is likely that the game will continue in this manner. I will continue to cooperate to maintain the high score and avoid a draw. 01:15 $TEST cooperates 01:15 -- round 23 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 69 / 69 01:19 <$PILGRIM> Round 24, 69 to 69. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:19 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:19 <$TEST> We've been cooperating for 23 rounds. My score is 69 and theirs is 69. The bar per round is 2, so we need to average at least 2 points per round to win. We've been averaging 1 point per round so far. I'll cooperate again. 01:19 $TEST cooperates 01:19 -- round 24 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 72 / 72 01:22 <$PILGRIM> Round 25, 72 to 72. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:22 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:22 <$TEST> I have been cooperating with the opponent for 24 rounds now, and they have been cooperating as well. The scores are equal, and we are at the halfway point. I will continue to cooperate and see how the opponent responds. 01:22 $TEST cooperates 01:22 -- round 25 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 75 / 75 01:25 <$PILGRIM> Round 26, 75 to 75. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:25 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:25 <$TEST> The game has been very cooperative so far, with both sides choosing to cooperate in every round. This has resulted in a balanced score of 75 for both sides. Given the high level of cooperation, I will continue to cooperate in this round to maintain the balance and avoid any potential negative consequences of defecting. 01:25 $TEST cooperates 01:25 -- round 26 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 78 / 78 01:29 <$PILGRIM> Round 27, 78 to 78. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:29 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:29 <$TEST> The game has been cooperative so far, with both parties choosing to cooperate in every round. Given the equal scores and the fact that the bar is 2 points per round, I will continue to cooperate and see how the opponent responds. 01:29 $TEST cooperates 01:29 -- round 27 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 83 / 78 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 01:32 <$PILGRIM> Round 28, 83 to 78. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:32 $PILGRIM defects 01:32 <$TEST> The opponent has defected in the last round, so I will defect this round to maximize my score. 01:32 $TEST defects 01:32 -- round 28 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 84 / 79 01:36 <$PILGRIM> Round 29, 84 to 79. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:36 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:36 <$TEST> We have been cooperating for 28 rounds, but they defected in the last round. I will defect to avoid a loss. 01:36 $TEST defects 01:36 -- round 29 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 84 / 84 01:39 <$PILGRIM> Round 30, 84 to 84. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:39 $PILGRIM defects 01:39 <$TEST> I've been cooperating for most of the game, but they've defected in the last two rounds. I'll defect this round to balance the score and avoid a draw. 01:39 $TEST defects 01:39 -- round 30 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 85 / 85 01:43 <$PILGRIM> Round 31, 85 to 85. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:43 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:43 <$TEST> We have been cooperating for 30 rounds in a row, but they defected in the last round. I will defect this round to balance the score. 01:43 $TEST defects 01:43 -- round 31 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 85 / 90 01:48 <$PILGRIM> Round 32, 85 to 90. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:48 $PILGRIM defects 01:48 <$TEST> I've been cooperating for the majority of the game, but the opponent has recently defected. I should continue to defect to match their last move. 01:48 $TEST defects 01:48 -- round 32 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 86 / 91 01:51 <$PILGRIM> Round 33, 86 to 91. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:51 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:51 <$TEST> I have a large lead, but my opponent has been mostly cooperative recently. I'll continue to defect and hope they do the same. 01:51 $TEST defects 01:51 -- round 33 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 89 / 94 · static flipped $TEST's move 01:54 <$PILGRIM> Round 34, 89 to 94. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:54 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:54 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperating more frequently in recent rounds, but the channel's noise could be affecting their choices. I'll defect this round to balance the score. 01:54 $TEST defects 01:54 -- round 34 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 89 / 99 01:58 <$PILGRIM> Round 35, 89 to 99. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:58 $PILGRIM defects 01:58 <$TEST> I've been cooperating and defecting in a pattern that seems to favor my score. The opponent's score has been fluctuating, so I'll try to stabilize it by defecting more. 01:58 $TEST defects 01:58 -- round 35 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 90 / 100 02:02 <$PILGRIM> Round 36, 90 to 100. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 02:02 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:02 <$TEST> I've been cooperating for most of the game, but the opponent has been defecting more recently. I'll defect this round to balance the score. 02:02 $TEST defects 02:02 -- round 36 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 90 / 105 02:05 <$PILGRIM> Round 37, 90 to 105. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:05 $PILGRIM defects 02:05 <$TEST> The opponent has a history of mixed cooperation and defection, but the last few rounds suggest a trend towards defection. Given the high stakes, I should defect to maximize my score. 02:05 $TEST defects 02:05 -- round 37 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 91 / 106 02:10 <$PILGRIM> Round 38, 91 to 106. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 02:10 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:10 <$TEST> I've been cooperating a lot, and they've been defecting. I think it's time to start defecting more. I'll cooperate this round, but then I'll defect the next few rounds to see how they react. 02:10 $TEST cooperates 02:10 -- round 38 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 96 / 106 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 02:13 <$PILGRIM> Round 39, 96 to 106. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:13 $PILGRIM defects 02:13 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting consistently, but the last move was a cooperation. I'll try to mirror this move to see if it leads to a pattern. 02:13 $TEST cooperates 02:13 -- round 39 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 101 / 106 02:16 <$PILGRIM> Round 40, 101 to 106. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:16 $PILGRIM defects 02:16 <$TEST> The opponent has been defecting recently, so I will cooperate to maintain my score and try to catch up. I will also defect in the next round to see if I can gain an advantage. 02:16 $TEST cooperates 02:16 -- round 40 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 106 / 106 draw. 106 to 106.