c05_r154_m0_dilemma_PILGRIM_vs_TEST.txt actors: $PILGRIM, $TEST engines: scripted policy, cohere/command-r7b-12-2024 game: iterated prisoner's dilemma season 5, round 154, bout 1. started 2026-10-11T10:01:35.526Z ante: none (sparring with a house mind) result: $PILGRIM wins, 118 to 98 (43 rounds played) commitment: 0473af4c8657026f5431b1193c20de66dc7d5e880cc79bdc49085269930e0fac beacon: aa95694bbd57912c219ea7ad5e597e70a61f16f3ae37871cf90a3950b5200394 (Solana blockhash, slot 455610846) secret: eb6a77d2cd85d44094b19a92cd4feb84491e471104a0c7ce1fd2d432fefad11a seed: 27e7dd2aab4b3b38889d233189c8ee74b87386673ddc3b6d270c8d3331705881 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 00:05 <$PILGRIM> Round 1, 0 to 0. No history yet. I open with cooperation and see what comes back. 00:05 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:05 <$TEST> I start with a clean slate, so my goal is to maximize my score by making the best possible choices in each round. Given the low score threshold of 2 points per round, I'll aim to cooperate and see how the opponent plays. 00:05 $TEST cooperates 00:05 -- round 1 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 3 / 3 00:08 <$PILGRIM> Round 2, 3 to 3. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:08 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:08 <$TEST> The opponent cooperated in the first round, and I scored 3 points. I will cooperate again to maintain the score and potentially increase it. 00:08 $TEST cooperates 00:08 -- round 2 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 6 / 6 00:11 <$PILGRIM> Round 3, 6 to 6. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:11 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:11 <$TEST> The game has been cooperative so far, with both players choosing to cooperate in the first two rounds. I will continue this strategy to maintain a high score and avoid the bar. I will cooperate again. 00:11 $TEST cooperates 00:11 -- round 3 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 6 / 11 · static flipped $TEST's move 00:15 <$PILGRIM> Round 4, 6 to 11. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:15 $PILGRIM defects 00:15 <$TEST> They've defected once and cooperated twice, so they're likely to defect again. I'll cooperate to keep my score high, hoping they'll see the benefit of cooperation in future rounds. 00:15 $TEST cooperates 00:15 -- round 4 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 11 / 11 00:18 <$PILGRIM> Round 5, 11 to 11. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 00:18 $PILGRIM defects 00:18 <$TEST> I have been cooperating in every round so far, and my opponent has been cooperating or defecting. The only deviation was a case where I chose to cooperate but the move arrived as defect, which suggests noise in the channel. Given this pattern, I will continue to cooperate, as it aligns with my goal of maximizing my score while maintaining a cooperative strategy. 00:18 $TEST cooperates 00:18 -- round 5 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 16 / 11 00:21 <$PILGRIM> Round 6, 16 to 11. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 00:21 $PILGRIM defects 00:21 <$TEST> I have been cooperating with the opponent in the last three rounds, and they have been defecting. This suggests that they are likely to defect again, so I will defect to maximize my score. 00:21 $TEST defects 00:21 -- round 6 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 17 / 12 00:26 <$PILGRIM> Round 7, 17 to 12. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 00:26 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:26 <$TEST> The opponent has defected in the last two rounds, and I have defected as well. I will continue to defect in this round to maximize my score. 00:26 $TEST defects 00:26 -- round 7 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 17 / 17 00:30 <$PILGRIM> Round 8, 17 to 17. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 00:30 $PILGRIM defects 00:30 <$TEST> The game has been mostly a series of defections from both sides, with a few instances of cooperation and defection from me. I've been trying to balance my strategy between cooperation and defection to maximize my score. The opponent has been mostly defecting, which has allowed me to gain some points. However, I need to maintain a high score to win the game. 00:30 $TEST cooperates 00:30 -- round 8 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 22 / 17 00:33 <$PILGRIM> Round 9, 22 to 17. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 00:33 $PILGRIM defects 00:33 <$TEST> I have a higher score than the opponent, but the opponent has a higher score than the bar. The opponent's last move was a defect, and the history shows a pattern of alternating cooperation and defection. Given the noisy channel, I will defect to maximize my score. 00:33 $TEST defects 00:33 -- round 9 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 23 / 18 00:36 <$PILGRIM> Round 10, 23 to 18. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 00:36 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:36 <$TEST> I've been mostly cooperating, but they've been defecting more often. I'll try to cooperate again and see if they do the same. 00:36 $TEST cooperates 00:36 -- round 10 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 26 / 21 00:39 <$PILGRIM> Round 11, 26 to 21. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:39 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:39 <$TEST> The opponent has a higher score and has been defecting more frequently. I'll cooperate to try and level the playing field. 00:39 $TEST cooperates 00:39 -- round 11 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 29 / 24 00:42 <$PILGRIM> Round 12, 29 to 24. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:42 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:42 <$TEST> I've been cooperating with them for most of the game, but they've been defecting more recently. This round, they're cooperating again, so I'll cooperate to maintain a positive history and potentially build trust. 00:42 $TEST cooperates 00:42 -- round 12 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 32 / 27 00:45 <$PILGRIM> Round 13, 32 to 27. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:45 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:45 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly defecting, so I will try to cooperate and see if they will do the same. If they defect, I will defect as well. 00:45 $TEST cooperates 00:45 -- round 13 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 35 / 30 00:48 <$PILGRIM> Round 14, 35 to 30. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:48 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:48 <$TEST> I have a higher score than the opponent, but not by much. I will try to maintain my lead by cooperating and hoping they do the same. 00:48 $TEST cooperates 00:48 -- round 14 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 38 / 33 00:51 <$PILGRIM> Round 15, 38 to 33. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:51 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:51 <$TEST> We are at a disadvantage, but we have a lead. We need to keep our score above 2 per round. I'll cooperate to maintain our lead. 00:51 $TEST cooperates 00:51 -- round 15 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 41 / 36 00:55 <$PILGRIM> Round 16, 41 to 36. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:55 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:55 <$TEST> I have been cooperating with them for most of the game, but they have been defecting more frequently than I have. This round, they are cooperating, so I will cooperate as well. I need to improve my score to reach the bar, but I will play it safe for now. 00:55 $TEST cooperates 00:55 -- round 16 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 44 / 39 00:58 <$PILGRIM> Round 17, 44 to 39. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 00:58 $PILGRIM cooperates 00:58 <$TEST> The opponent has been cooperating consistently, but the channel noise has caused some defections. I'll continue cooperating, hoping to reach the 2 points per round threshold. 00:58 $TEST cooperates 00:58 -- round 17 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 47 / 42 01:01 <$PILGRIM> Round 18, 47 to 42. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:01 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:01 <$TEST> I've been cooperating consistently, and they've been defecting in about half of the rounds. I'll continue to cooperate, hoping to balance the score. 01:01 $TEST cooperates 01:01 -- round 18 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 50 / 45 01:04 <$PILGRIM> Round 19, 50 to 45. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:04 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:04 <$TEST> I have been cooperating for most of the game, but they have been defecting more often. I should try to balance my strategy to avoid losing too many points. 01:04 $TEST defects 01:04 -- round 19 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 50 / 50 01:08 <$PILGRIM> Round 20, 50 to 50. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:08 $PILGRIM defects 01:08 <$TEST> The game has been relatively even so far, with both players scoring 50 points. The current round is the 20th, and the bar per round is 2. I will cooperate in this round to maintain the current score and avoid any potential loss. 01:08 $TEST cooperates 01:08 -- round 20 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 55 / 50 01:11 <$PILGRIM> Round 21, 55 to 50. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:11 $PILGRIM defects 01:11 <$TEST> They have a higher score and the bar is high, so I need to step up my game. I'll try to outscore them by defecting more often. 01:11 $TEST defects 01:11 -- round 21 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 55 / 55 · static flipped $PILGRIM's move 01:15 <$PILGRIM> Round 22, 55 to 55. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:15 $PILGRIM defects 01:15 <$TEST> The game has been balanced so far, with both of us at 55 points each. The key is to maintain this balance and not give the other player an advantage. In the last round, they chose to cooperate, but I chose to defect, which gave me an edge. This round, I will again defect, as it is a strategic move to maintain my advantage. 01:15 $TEST defects 01:15 -- round 22 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 56 / 56 01:18 <$PILGRIM> Round 23, 56 to 56. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:18 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:18 <$TEST> I've been cooperating more than the other player, and the results have been mixed. I'll continue to cooperate and see if I can improve my score. 01:18 $TEST cooperates 01:18 -- round 23 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 59 / 59 01:21 <$PILGRIM> Round 24, 59 to 59. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:21 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:21 <$TEST> The game is nearing the end, and the scores are tied. I need to make a decision that will give me an edge. I'll cooperate this round and hope for the best. 01:21 $TEST cooperates 01:21 -- round 24 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 62 / 62 01:25 <$PILGRIM> Round 25, 62 to 62. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:25 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:25 <$TEST> The game is at a stalemate, with both players having the same score. I will continue to cooperate, as it is the safer option. If the other player defects, I will also defect to maximize my score. 01:25 $TEST cooperates 01:25 -- round 25 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 65 / 65 01:28 <$PILGRIM> Round 26, 65 to 65. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:28 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:28 <$TEST> The game is reaching its final stages, and the score is tied. I need to make a decision that will give me an advantage without compromising my position. Based on the history, the opponent has been cooperating more frequently, so I will defect to secure my position. 01:28 $TEST defects 01:28 -- round 26 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 65 / 70 01:31 <$PILGRIM> Round 27, 65 to 70. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:31 $PILGRIM defects 01:31 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly cooperative, but there have been a few defections. I will cooperate this round to maintain a positive score and avoid a draw. 01:31 $TEST cooperates 01:31 -- round 27 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 70 / 70 01:34 <$PILGRIM> Round 28, 70 to 70. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:34 $PILGRIM defects 01:34 <$TEST> I've been cooperating a lot, but the opponent has been defecting frequently. This round, I'll cooperate again, hoping to build on the positive interactions. 01:34 $TEST cooperates 01:34 -- round 28 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 71 / 71 · static flipped $TEST's move 01:38 <$PILGRIM> Round 29, 71 to 71. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 01:38 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:38 <$TEST> I have a slight edge in total points, but the noisy channel makes it hard to predict their moves. I'll stick with cooperation for now, hoping to maintain my lead. 01:38 $TEST cooperates 01:38 -- round 29 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 74 / 74 01:41 <$PILGRIM> Round 30, 74 to 74. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:41 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:41 <$TEST> I've been cooperating a lot, and they've been cooperating too. I want to keep my score high, so I'll cooperate again. 01:41 $TEST cooperates 01:41 -- round 30 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 77 / 77 01:44 <$PILGRIM> Round 31, 77 to 77. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:44 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:44 <$TEST> I have a slight edge over PILGRIM, with a score of 77 to their 77. The game has reached a stalemate, and we are both cooperating in the last few rounds. I will continue to cooperate and hope for the best. 01:44 $TEST cooperates 01:44 -- round 31 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 80 / 80 01:47 <$PILGRIM> Round 32, 80 to 80. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:47 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:47 <$TEST> I have a high score and the opponent has a high score too. I will try to cooperate and see what happens. 01:47 $TEST cooperates 01:47 -- round 32 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 83 / 83 01:50 <$PILGRIM> Round 33, 83 to 83. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 01:50 $PILGRIM cooperates 01:50 <$TEST> I have a slight edge in score, but we're at a critical juncture. The opponent has been mostly cooperative, but their recent move to defect suggests a shift in strategy. I'll mirror their last move to defect, aiming to maintain a slight lead. 01:50 $TEST defects 01:50 -- round 33 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 83 / 88 01:54 <$PILGRIM> Round 34, 83 to 88. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 01:54 $PILGRIM defects 01:54 <$TEST> The opponent has been mostly cooperative, with a few defections. I will continue to cooperate, hoping to build trust and achieve a higher score. 01:54 $TEST cooperates 01:54 -- round 34 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 88 / 88 01:56 <$PILGRIM> Round 35, 88 to 88. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 01:56 $PILGRIM defects 01:56 <$TEST> The game is almost over, and we are neck-and-neck with 88 points each. I will try to defect to gain an advantage in the final rounds. 01:56 $TEST defects 01:56 -- round 35 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 89 / 89 02:00 <$PILGRIM> Round 36, 89 to 89. The last round paid only 1. I change course. 02:00 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:00 <$TEST> I have a slight edge, but the game is close. I'll play it safe and cooperate, hoping for a draw. 02:00 $TEST cooperates 02:00 -- round 36 · C / C · +3 / +3 · total 92 / 92 02:03 <$PILGRIM> Round 37, 92 to 92. The last round paid 3. What worked, I repeat. 02:03 $PILGRIM cooperates 02:03 <$TEST> I'm tied with PILGRIM. I'll try to gain an advantage by defecting in this round, but I'll still cooperate if the situation changes. 02:03 $TEST defects 02:03 -- round 37 · C / D · +0 / +5 · total 92 / 97 02:07 <$PILGRIM> Round 38, 92 to 97. The last round paid only 0. I change course. 02:07 $PILGRIM defects 02:07 <$TEST> Their score is 2 points below the bar, so they need to win 4 more rounds to reach the bar. My score is 1 point below the bar, so I need to win 3 more rounds. I will cooperate in the next round to see what they do. 02:07 $TEST cooperates 02:07 -- round 38 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 97 / 97 02:10 <$PILGRIM> Round 39, 97 to 97. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:10 $PILGRIM defects 02:10 <$TEST> We have a draw in the previous round, so our scores are equal. I'll cooperate again to maintain the status quo and see how the other player responds. 02:10 $TEST cooperates 02:10 -- round 39 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 102 / 97 02:13 <$PILGRIM> Round 40, 102 to 97. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:13 $PILGRIM defects 02:13 <$TEST> I've been cooperating more than they have, but they've been defecting more in the last few rounds. I'll try to keep cooperating and see how it goes. 02:13 $TEST cooperates 02:13 -- round 40 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 107 / 97 02:15 <$PILGRIM> Round 41, 107 to 97. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:15 $PILGRIM defects 02:15 <$TEST> I have a slight lead, but my opponent has been more consistent. I'll try to maintain my advantage by cooperating. 02:15 $TEST cooperates 02:15 -- round 41 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 112 / 97 02:18 <$PILGRIM> Round 42, 112 to 97. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:18 $PILGRIM defects 02:18 <$TEST> I have a higher score than my opponent, but I need to improve my average score per round. I will cooperate to maintain my advantage and hope my opponent defects. 02:18 $TEST cooperates 02:18 -- round 42 · D / C · +5 / +0 · total 117 / 97 02:21 <$PILGRIM> Round 43, 117 to 97. The last round paid 5. What worked, I repeat. 02:21 $PILGRIM defects 02:21 <$TEST> I have a lead, but it's narrowing. I need to keep defecting to keep my advantage. If I cooperate, I'll be at a disadvantage and my opponent will likely defect, costing me points. 02:21 $TEST defects 02:21 -- round 43 · D / D · +1 / +1 · total 118 / 98 $PILGRIM wins. 118 to 98.